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INTRODUCTION
When he retires in February 1992, Chief Justice Vincent L. McK-
usick will leave an enduring legacy for Maine and the nation in the
rules governing civil practice in the Maine courts and the machinery
for judicial rulemaking developed under his leadership.
Procedure and jurisdiction were subjects of intellectual and pro-
fessional interest for McKusick long before his chief justiceship.
Graduating from the Harvard Law School in 1950, he had been a
student there when Professors Richard Field and Benjamin Kaplan,
both members of the Harvard faculty's post-war generation, were at
the threshold of their effort to make the still new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure the focal point of law school procedural instruction.1
As law clerk to Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter in the two suc-
ceeding years, McKusick served apprenticeships with two of the
most stimulating intellects in the federal judiciary at a time when
practitioners and judges in the nation's most sophisticated courts
were grappling with thorny procedural questions under the new
rules.2 In 1952, following Frankfurter's oft-stated advice, he re-
turned to Maine to practice law in Portland.'
1. For a discussion of the background and development of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. As to Field and
Kaplan, see A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 376, 378 (1967). Their casebook,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, published in 1953, was a pio-
neering effort to consider civil procedure as a system best studied through the me-
dium of the Federal Rules in the broader setting of federal jurisdiction. See Lubick,
Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1954); Kaufman, Book Review, 8 RUTGERS L.
REV. 558 (1954). It is now a commonplace that succeeding generations of law students
have learned their civil procedure through the medium of the Rules. See, e.g., Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in His-
torical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 910 n. 5 (1987); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE
& A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE XV (1985); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE XXi
(3d ed. 1985).
2. For discussion of procedural and jurisdictional developments under the Federal
Rules in the early 1950's, see Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: Tile Func-
tion of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521 (1954); Clark, "Clarify-
ing" Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1953). For decisions of
"his" justice addressing procedural concerns during McKusick's clerkship, see Kero-
test Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 186 n. 6 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J.) (applicability of FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320-
23 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (construction of pleadings in action to deter-
mine constitutionality of school released-time statute). See also Sutphen Estates,
Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951) (Douglas, J.) (denial of intervention of right
under FED. R. CIv. P. 24(c) where issues to be tried would not be res judicata as to
would-be intervenor).
3. See Frankfurter, The Profession of the Law, in OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER
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Beginning with his appointment in 1957 to the Advisory Commit-
tee established by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to develop
rules of civil procedure based on the federal model, McKusick be-
came a leader in the development and reform of civil procedure on
the national as well as the state level. In Maine, his work with the
initial Advisory Committee led to his coauthorship of Maine Civil
Practice with Professor Field, the committee's reporter. He was ap-
pointed chair of the Advisory Committee when it was reestablished
by the court on a permanent basis in 1967. These activities made
him a natural candidate for a variety of national organizations deal-
ing with procedure and related subjects. In turn, his work at the
national level brought to Maine ideas and insights which have put
the state at the forefront of procedural reform.
McKusick's role in Maine is described in detail in subsequent sec-
tions of this Article. His national involvement began in 1964 when
he was appointed to the American Bar Association's Special Com-
mittee on Federal Rules of Procedure. He served as the Committee's
chairman from 1966 until 1971. 4 He was appointed a Maine Com-
missioner of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1968. In that capacity he served as chairman of the
Conference's Drafting Committee on the Uniform Jury Selection
and Service Act and its Review Committee on the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He was secretary to the Commission from 1975
until 1977.1 Since 1968 he has served on the Council of the American
Law Institute, which, among its many concerns, reviewed and ap-
proved provisions of the Restatements (Second) of Conflict of Laws
and Judgments dealing with such critical procedural issues as juris-
diction of the person and of the subject matter.0
McKusick was confirmed as Maine's Chief Justice on September
16, 1977.7 As the remainder of this Article shows, he asserted the
power of that office to continue Maine's leadership in the field of
procedure. McKusick has also increased the level of his national ac-
tivities. He has served on a special joint committee of the Judicial
THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FEux FRANKFURTER. 1956-1963. 146.
161-62 (1969).
4. See 89 A.B. REP. 43 (1964). Subjects studied by the committee under McK-
usick's chairmanship included Proposed FED. R. APP. P 30 providing for a single rec-
ord appendix, the original 1967 proposal that led to the 1970 amendments of the
discovery rules, and the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See 92 ABA REP 596
(1967); 93 id. at 357-58, 394, 549-53 (1968); 94 id. at 799 (1969); 95 id. at 332, 991
(1970).
5. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 27, 51 (1968).
See aLso id. at 22 (1969); id. at 23, 94, 110 (1970); id. at 64 (1975).
6. See 45 AL.L PROC. iii (1968). See also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDCME S
iv, §§ 1-12 (1982); 2 id. §§ 78-80; 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws iv,
§§ 24-144 (1971).
7. See 2 Me. Legis. Rec. 2-4 (Sen. Confirmation Sess., Sept. 16, 1977).
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Conference of the United States and the National Conference of
Chief Justices charged with considering procedural issues in the re-
lationship between the federal and state courts.' From 1987 to 1989,
he was a member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure." Since 1987, he has been a member of the
Board of the Conference of Chief Justices, which he currently serves
as President. 10 In that capacity, he also serves as Chairperson of the
Board of Directors of the National Center for State Courts, a pri-
mary agency of reform in the ar6as of court administration and pro-
cedure.11 With all his activities he has also found time to publish.12
This Article will first review Vincent McKusick's involvement in
the adoption of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and his subse-
quent leadership in the development of the Rules and the rulemak-
ing process. This review will provide an opportunity to consider the
process by which growth and change in Maine procedure have oc-
curred, the ways in which Maine has responded to critical challenges
facing the courts, and issues and directions for future development.
I. VINCENT McKuSICK AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAINE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Promulgation of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure in 1959 was a
reflection in Maine of the natidnal tide of procedural reform stimu-
lated by the adoption and success of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The Maine Rules responded at the state level to the same
problems which the Federal Rules had addressed. Vincent McK-
usick's background in federal practice prepared him to take a lead-
ing role in the development of the Maine Rules.
A. The Federal Model
The procedural reform which culminated in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure began in 1906 when the American Bar Association,
stimulated by a paper delivered by Roscoe Pound, appointed a com-
mittee to study the matter.13 The Supreme Court of the United
8. See McKusick, State Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal For
Recognition, 36 MAINE L. REV. 253 (1984).
9. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1007 (2d
ed. 1987).
10. See 5 ME. BAR J. 314 (1990).
11. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 3-5, 6-23 (1990).
12. See McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for Cooperation Between State
and Federal Courts, 16 MAINE L. REV. 33 (1964); McKusick, supra note 8.
13. The account of the development of the Federal Rules in the following
paragraphs is based on that in 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, §§ 1002-1007.
See also Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemak-
ing, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989); Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L
REV. 1999 (1989); Subrin, supra note 1.
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States had long been the source of federal equity ruleq and since
1842 had had rulemaking power for actions at law in federal
courts. 4 With the latter power unexercised, however, procedure at
law under the terms of the Conformity Act, adopted in 1789, had
followed that of the state in which each federal district court sat.'5
Although a number of western states had adopted New York's
1848 Field Code, most states followed common law civil procedure,
with a wide variety of local variations. Both systems had major
faults: The common law emphasized formalistic pleading that
sought to narrow the controversy to a single issue of law to be heard
upon demurrer, or a single issue of fact to be tried to a jury. The
codes replaced the common law forms with a new formalism requir-
ing that the pleadings set forth, in often prolix detail, the elements
of each cause of action or defense as a matrix of facts either to be
tested for legal sufficiency on demurrer or to be proven exactly at
trial. The largely separate equity practice in the state courts, as
under the federal Equity Rules, offered tell-it-like-it-is pleading,
flexible rules for joinder of claims and parties, and extensive pretrial
discovery. Because of its complexity and cumbersomeness, however,
this practice could all too often emulate the exemplar proffered by
Dickens in Bleak House.'8
When the ABA House of Delegates voted in 1911 to support the
development and adoption of uniform rules of federal procedure to
be promulgated by the Supreme Court and to serve also as a model
for the states, the ABA was responding both to the needs of lawyers
with multi-jurisdictional practices and to the impulse for pure pro-
cedural reform. Despite continued lobbying by the ABA, action in
Congress was blocked for more than twenty years by legislators from
code states who purported to fear, not an invasion of carpetbagging
eastern lawyers, but the imposition of the complexities of federal
equity practice upon their relatively simple and familiar procedural
codes.1
7
With the New Deal and a new generation of lawyers, the climate
abruptly changed. Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in
1934.18 At the American Law Institute meeting in 1935, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes announced that federal rulemaking would begin in ear-
nest. In June of that year, the Supreme Court established the model
14. Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, §6, 5 Stat, 516, 518.
15. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93; Act of Aug. 1. 1842, ch. 109, 5
Stat. 499.
16. For the Field Code, see 4 0. WRGHT & A. MmaiR. supra note 9. § 1002. at 12.
See Subrin, supra note 1, at 982-83.
17. For the reactions of the westerners, see C. CLARK. PROCEDURa-Tn HANDMIAD
OF Jusrnca ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK 12-13 (1965). For the ABA's lobbying
effort, see 4 C. WRGr & A. MjLEaR. supra note 9, § 1003.
18. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. As to the politics, see Subrin,
supra note 1, at 969.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
that has subsequently guided rulemaking efforts not only in the fed-
eral system but in Maine and many other states. The Court ap-
pointed a distinguished Advisory Committee of practitioners and
academics chaired by former Attorney General William Mitchell.
Professor Charles Clark of Yale, co-author of a law review article
which had spurred the effort, was appointed reporter. After public
distribution and discussion of three printed drafts, the Court, with
Justice Brandeis dissenting, adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, creating one form of action and merging law and equity. In
accordance with the Enabling Act, the Federal Rules were transmit-
ted to Congress in January 1938. Despite expressions of opposition
by some members, Congress took no negative action and the Rules
as promulgated became effective on September 16, 1938.10
Since 1942, the federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, rees-
tablished in 1958 as a committee of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, has proposed numerous amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure designed to attune the Rules to changing
needs of practice.2 0 The Supreme Court has adopted many but not
all of these amendments, and Congress has on occasion exercised a
concurrent power to amend the Federal Rules.
B. Adoption of the Maine Rules
The original notion that the Federal Rules would serve as a model
for the states was slow in taking hold-a delay certainly exacerbated
by the distracting and absorbing impact of World War II. By 1942
three states and the District of Columbia had adopted by court or-
der comprehensive rules of civil procedure based on the federal
model. By 1956, only three additional states had followed suit.2 1 In
that year, Justice Francis W. Sullivan, who, as keeper of the flame of
traditional practice books, was current author of the eighth edition
of Maine Civil Officer,22 at the annual meeting of the Maine State
19. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 1004, and sources
cited therein.
20. As to the Advisory Committee, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, §§
1004-1007.
21. See Oakley and Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: a Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1428 (1986).
22. F. SULLIVAN, MAINE CIVIL OFFICER (8th ed. 1950 & Supp. 1963). Sullivan's work
was the last in a series of Maine practice manuals tracing its origins to the justice of
the peace handbooks that were the principal popular law books of 18th and 19th
century England and America. The first edition of Maine Civil Officer was written by
Edward S. Morris in 1860 and published in 1861 in Portland by Bailey & Noyes. It
was revised and corrected before publication by the Hon. Ether Shepley. See id., at
III. The title, if not the concept, derived from J. PERLEY, THE MAINE CIVIL OFFICER OR
THE POWERS OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, AND COLLECTORS OF TAXES (Hallo-
well 1825), a work that "does not treat of procedure to any great degree." Id. As to
Perley!s predecessors, see, e.g., M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (London, 1746); S.
[Vol. 43:389
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Bar Association urged consideration of the adoption of the Federal
Rules in Maine2 3
As Justice Sullivan's two-volume work amply documented, Maine
procedure at that time was a complicated and confusing blend of
traditional common law pleading rules and the results of 130 years
of partial statutory codification. The common law forms of action
were still in effect, and a separate equity jurisdiction was exercised
by the superior court concurrently with single justices of the Su-
preme Judicial Court.2 4 The courts were also governed by three sets
of rules most recently recodified by the concerted action of the Su-
preme Judicial Court and the justices of the superior court in 1952:
the Revised Rules of Court, many of which had first been promul-
gated in 1822, governing actions at law and criminal proceedings in
the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior court; the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court Rules, governing bar admission and Law Court proceed-
ings; and the Equity Rules, a modern set of rules governing equity
matters in the superior court and before a single justice of the Su-
preme Judicial Court.2 5
Justice Sullivan's address stimulated the Bar Association to ob-
tain enabling legislation for rulemaking. The Enabling Act authoriz-
ing the Supreme Judicial Court to make comprehensive rules that
would provide one form of action and merge law and equity was en-
acted in 1957, and funds were appropriated to support the rulemak-
ing process.2 6 The Supreme Judicial Court quickly responded to this
invitation. The Advisory Committee on Rules was appointed in Au-
gust 1957 and set immediately to work, with Leonard "Squire"
Pierce, McKusick's senior partner, as chairman, and his Harvard
Law School mentor, Professor Field, as reporter. In the circum-
stances, it is hardly surprising that the young associate was ap-
pointed to this blue-ribbon panel consisting of leaders of the bar
FREEMAN, THE MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE (1795) (2d ed. 1802) (3d ed. 1810); RoDoLpitus
DICKINSON, DiCKINSON'S JUSTICE (1818).
23. Address by Justice Francis W. Sullivan, 45 ME. ST. BAR ASSN PROc. 38 (1956).
24. See generally 1 F. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 176-233. For a work extensively
used by Maine practitioners, see F. MARTIN. LECTURES ON Co:, oN LAw PLEADINo
(1913 & reprint 1930), a course of lectures given at the old University of Maine Col-
lege of Law between 1900 and 1913. See also Address by Richard H. Field, Proposed
Rules of Civil Procedure for Maine, 47 ME1. ST. BAR ASS'N PROc. 30, 33-35 (Aug. 26-
28,1958); 1 R. FIELD, V. McKuszCK & LK WROTH. MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 1.0 (2d ed.
1970) [hereinafter FILD, McKusICK & WROTH]; Reporter's Notes to M.R. Civ. P. 2,
id. at 34.
25. See generally 1 FIELD. McKusICK & WROTH, supra, note 24, at 13-14. For the
recodification, see 147 Me. 464-504 (1952), amended by 148 Me. 533 (1953), 152 Me.
57 (1956), 153 Me. 221-26, 382 (1958).
26. P.L. 1957, ch. 159; 1957 resolves, ch. 148. R.S. ch. 103. § 7-A 1954, was
amended by P.L. 1959, ct 309, effective May 15, 1959. The Enabling Act is now
codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANm tit. 4 § 8.
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from throughout the state.27
At its October 1957 organizational meeting, the Advisory Commit-
tee divided the Federal Rules into six sections, and two-member
subcommittees were charged with systematically reviewing each sec-
tion.28 The subcommittees prepared draft rules based on Professor
Field's analysis of the appropriate Federal Rules.29 The subcommit-
tees' initial reports, consisting of proposed rule drafts and the re-
porter's explanations of the proposals, were collected in the "Blue
Book," a mimeographed compilation published for the August 1958
meeting of the full committee.30 Changes in the subcommittee drafts
proposed by the full committee were compiled in a supplement pub-
lished with the August draft for committee review in November
1958-the so-called "Green Book." 31 These and a few additional mi-
nor changes were consolidated in the committee's tentative draft
distributed to the bar in December 1958-the "White Book. 3 2
The tentative draft was reviewed and discussed at length in a day-
long general session conducted by Professor Field and committee
members at the January 1959 meeting of the Maine State Bar Asso-
ciation. Revisions proposed as a result of that session were compiled
in the "Brown Book. '3 3 This volume and the White Book consti-
tuted the committee's report and recommendations, which were sub-
mitted to the court on February 5, 1959. With the committee's work
done, Professor Field, assisted by McKusick, worked directly with
the court in the preparation of the "Court Draft."' After enactment
of an extensive statutory cleanup measure also prepared by Profes-
sor Field, the court on June 1, 1959, issued its order promulgating
the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, with Appendix of Forms, to be-
27. See Williamson, Foreword to First Edition, reprinted in FIELD, McKusICK &
WROTH, supra note 24, at XIII-XV.
28. Field, Introduction, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF COURT PROCE-
DURE, MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE i (tentative draft for committee use only,
Aug. 1, 1958) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK].
29. Id. at ii. For McKusick's role in this process, see infra note 82 and accompa-
nying text.
30. See BLUE BOOK, supra note 28. See also Williamson, supra note 27, at XV;
Field, supra note 24, at 32-33.
31. See Supplement to BLUE BOOK, supra note 28 (Nov. 11, 1958) [hereinafter
GREEN BOOK]. See also Williamson, supra note 27, at XVI.
32. See SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, MAINE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (tentative draft 1958) [hereinafter WHITE BOOK]. See also Williamson,
supra note 27, at XVI.
33. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE, ADDITIONS,
CHANGES, AND CORRECTIONS IN TENTATIVE DRAFT OF MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(Feb. 1, 1959) [hereinafter BROWN BOOK]. See also Williamson, supra note 27, at
XVI. For the January 1959 proceedings, see Field, Civil Procedure-Forum on the
New Rules, 48 Me. St. Bar Ass'n. Proc. 44 (1959).
34. See MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (court
draft, Apr. 20, 1959). See also Williamson, supra note 27, at XVI.
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come effective December 1, 1959.3 Municipal Court Civil Rules, de-
veloped by Professor Field and a separate committee to adapt the
new provisions to that jurisdiction, were also promulgated to be ef-
fective on the same date.36 Professor Field's reporter's notes, based
on the commentaries he had prepared for the subcommittees, were
published with the Rules of Civil Procedure and were declared to be
an authoritative guide to interpretation."'
C. Maine Civil Practice: The Treatise
With the work of the Advisory Committee and its reporter com-
pleted, Field and McKusick undertook a complementary task
designed to make the Rules more accessible and acceptable to the
Maine bench and bar. Working through the spring and summer of
1959, they together wrote the first edition of the treatise, Maine
Civil Practice. Thanks to their intensive effort, the book was pub-
lished by the Boston Law Book Company, a local affiliate of West
Publishing Company, simultaneously with the effective date of the
Rules in December 1959.
The treatise, long familiar to all Maine practitioners, dealt with
each rule in systematic form, setting forth the rule text and re-
porter's notes and providing commentary which served a threefold
purpose: explanation of the intended function of each new rule,
comparison with former Maine practice, and presentation of appro-
priate decisions in the federal courts and other states interpreting
and applying identical rules. The authors also compared each Maine
rule to its federal counterpart, pointing out significant variations,
and included suggested forms to deal with matters not covered in
the Appendix of Forms promulgated with the Rules. The treatise
also contained the Municipal Court Civil Rules and Professor Field's
memorandum to the Legislature explaining the statutory clean-up
bill.-
Thanks both to the talents of its authors and the scope of its
treatment of the Rules, Maine Civil Practice was a work of more
than local importance. As the distinguished authority on federal ju-
risdiction and procedure, Professor Charles Alan Wright, said in re-
35. See Williamson, supra note 27, at XVII; P.L. 1959, ch. 317; Order of June 1,
1959, 155 Me. 477 (1959).
36. Order of June 1, 1959, 155 Me. 477, 625.641 (1959). See Williamson, supra
note 27, at XVI-XVII; Maine Municipal Court Civil Rules and reporter's notes, FtELD
& McKusIcK, MAINE Civwi PRACTICE 673-97 (1959); id. at 165-69 (Supp. 1967).
37. See Williamson, supra note 27, at XVII; 1 FiELD. McKusicK & Womn, supra
note 24, at 26-27.
38. FIELD & McKusicK. supra note 36. Supplements to the first edition were pub-
lished in 1962 with Frederick A. Johnson and in 1967 with the present author. A
second edition was published in 1970. That edition was supplemented several times
with the assistance of others. See FIELD. McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24 (Supp.
1972); id. (Supp. 1974); id. (Supp. 1977); id. (Supp. 1981).
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viewing the second edition of Maine Civil Practice in 1970:
Maine lawyers hardly need to be told by a friend from Texas of
the excellence of the book that Professor Field and Mr. McKusick
did more than a decade ago .... [lit may be of interest to Maine
lawyers to know that the virtues of their local procedure book are
recognized far beyond the New Hampshire border.... [W]hen
the distinguished federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
wanted to point to a single source in which the rationale for [the]
work product [rule] is best stated, it turned to Maine's book.
Shortly after the first edition of this book appeared, I referred to
it as "an excellent treatise," and I have kept a copy close at hand
in my office so that I may benefit from its useful insights into pro-
cedural problems when I am engaged in my own writing about pro-
cedure in the federal system.3
D. The Maine District Court Civil Rules
In 1962, Field and McKusick also served as advisors to the Su-
preme Judicial Court in the adaptation of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure for practice in the district court, created by the Legisla-
ture in 1961 to supersede the municipal courts and trial justices.40
The Supreme Judicial Court appointed a District Court Rules Com-
mittee of practitioners chaired by Frank E. Southard, Jr., of Au-
gusta, to address the procedure of the new court. The committee,
together with the newly appointed district court judges, drafted a
set of rules based on the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. After a
conference participated in by Field and McKusick, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court promulgated the District Court Civil Rules, "[w]ith mi-
nor changes resulting from the discussion at the meeting and further
study," in July 1962. The committee's notes were published with the
Rules in the same fashion that the reporter's notes had been pub-
lished with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.42
E. The Amendment Process
1. Consultant and Committee Chair
Vincent McKusick was actively involved from the beginning in
the process of updating the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure by
amendment. The first amendments of the Maine Rules were a series
39. Wright, Book Review, 22 MAINE L. REV. 511, 511-12 (1970) (citing 1 BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 59 (C. Wright ed. 1960)).
40. P.L. 1961, ch. 386, now ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 151-171. See generally
H. HENRY, THE MAINE DisTRIar COURT: A QuARTER CENTURY OF PROGRESS 3-20
(1987). For the municipal courts and the interim rules adopted for them, see supra
note 36.
41. Wiliamson, Foreword to Maine District Court Civil Rules, 2 FIELD, McK-
USICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 401-402; see 158 Me. 537 (1962). Regarding the
interpretive effect of the Committee notes, see id. at 421-22.
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of technical changes promulgated in September and November 1959
before the Rules even took effect."2 Beginning in 1960, Field and
McKusick acted informally as advisors to the court in the promulga-
tion of amendments, developing more than a dozen promulgation or-
ders affecting thirty-one separate rule provisions or official forms.
The advisors prepared unofficial notes titled "Explanation of
Amendment," which were published in supplements to Maine Civil
Practice as the equivalent of reporter's notes.43 Most of these
amendments were also technical, but a few were of more far-reach-
ing effect."
The first substantial group of amendments based on a systematic
review of the Rules was adopted effective November 1, 1966. These
amendments, prepared by Professor Field, McKusick, and the pre-
sent author at the request of the court acting at Professor Field's
suggestion, were intended to conform the Maine Rules to a number
of changes made in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963 and
1966, primarily affecting process, pleading, and parties.'5
In February 1967, the Supreme Judicial Court reestablished the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, naming McKusick as chairman,
a position which he held until 1975 .4 The court invited the bar to
submit proposals for amendment of the Rules to the committee for
review or recommendation to the court. Under McKusick's leader-
ship, with Professor Field and the present author as consultants, the
committee undertook a thorough review of the Rules. As a result of
this review, the committee recommended thirty-two amendments in
areas such as the pretrial conference, appeals to the Law Court, and
administrative appeals. The court promulgated the amendments
largely as recommended by the committee. In an introductory state-
ment to a pamphlet publication of the amendments, Chief Justice
Williamson stated: "The Committee reports that the Rules appear
in general to be working well and that no major overhaul is required.
With this view we agree. However, in certain limited areas these
42. See Orders of September 1, 1959, and November 2, 1959, 155 Me. 661. 676.
Further technical amendments were made by Order of January 19, 1960, effective
February 1, 1960. Id. at 680. All three sets of amendments were incorporated in the
full text of the rules as printed in the Maine Reports. Id. at 477. For examples of
these amendments, see, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 4(f) and 64(b); 2 Fizw, McKuslcK &
WROTH, supra note 24, at 97. See generally id., at 15 n.15.
43. For a summary of these early amendments, see 1 FMLiD. McKusicK & Witomr,
supra note 24, at 17. For the origin and effect of the "Explanation of Amendment"
notes, see id. at 18, 26-27.
44. See, e.g., the 1960 amendment of Rule 13 discussed infra note 108 and accom-
panying text, and the 1965 adoption of Rule 76B, discussed infro note 232 and ac-
companying text.
45. See Order of Sept. 1, 1966, Me. Rptr. 215-224 A.2d XXI (1966). effective Nov.
1, 1966. See generally 1 FimLD, McKusCK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 18.
46. See Order of Feb. 8, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXIV-XXV.
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amendments make significant changes."4
Following the pattern established in the federal rulemaking pro-
cess, the committee submitted its recommendations to the court ac-
companied by Advisory Committee's notes having an interpretive
value equivalent to that of the original reporter's notes.48 The Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules has been in continuous existence
since 1967. All subsequent amendments, except those promulgated
by the court without the recommendation of the committee, have
been accompanied by Advisory Committee's notes. 49
The court adopted Advisory Committee recommendations of sub-
stantial amendments in October 1969, July 1970, September 1971,
December 1972, and June and July 1973, covering such areas as fed-
eral discovery amendments, attachment, and the pretrial confer-
ence.50 In January 1974, the court adopted an order requiring each
of its Advisory Committees to give public notice and opportunity to
comment on any proposed rules amendments unless the court dis-
pensed with such notice in the public interest."1 Following adoption
of this procedure, a number of rules were amended in April 1975,
including those pertaining to reference, attachment, and discovery.2
On December 31, 1975, McKusick's final term as chairman of the
Advisory Committee came to an end. Working with Professors Field
and Wroth as coauthor of supplements to the second edition of
Maine Civil Practice and informal consultant on the Rules, he con-
47. See Order of Sept. 19, 1967, Me. Rptr. 225-237 A.2d XXVII (1967), effective
Dec. 31, 1967; Williamson, Introductory Statement, in Amendments to Maine Rules
of Civil Procedure, District Court Civil Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, District
Court Criminal Rules, 3 (pamphl. 1967). For further discussion of the committee pro-
cess, see 1 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 18-19; Wroth, The 1967
Amendments to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 MAINE L. REv. 49-51 (1968).
48. As to the federal Advisory Committee, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text. For the Maine Advisory Committee's Notes and their interpretive value, see
Williamson, supra note 47; 1 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 19, 26.
49. Amendments promulgated without Advisory Committee recommendation
have in most cases been accompanied by explanatory notes entitled "Explanation of
Amendment" or "Supreme Judicial Court Note" prepared by the drafters of the
amendments for the convenience of bench and bar. See, e.g., Order effective July 1,
1989, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d CLVIII-CLX; Order effective Feb. 1, 1984, Me. Rptr.,
467-478 A.2d XXXVI-XXXIX. In a few cases, notably where the change is an obvi-
ous one such as a fee increase, no explanation has been offered. See, e.g., Order effec-
tive July 1, 1986, Me. Rptr., 488-497 A.2d XL-XLII; Order effective May 1, 1986, Me.
Rptr., 498-509 A.2d CV-CVII.
50. See Orders of Oct. 1 & 6, 1969, Me. Rptr., 248-256 A.2d XIX, XXI; Order of
July 1, 1970, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XXXV; Order of Sept. 13, 1971, Me. Rptr., 276.
284 A.2d XIX; Order of Dec. 28, 1972, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX; Order of June
12, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XXII; and Order of July 27, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-
307 A.2d XIX. See generally 1 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 17; id.
(Supp. 1981) at 9-10.
51. Order of Jan. 21, 1974, Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XLVII.
52. Order effective Apr. 15, 1975, and advisory committee's notes, Me. Rptr., 326-
335 A.2d XXII-XLII.
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tinued to have a significant role in the amendment process until his
appointment as chief justice in September 1977. Important groups
of amendments in this period accommodated the Civil Rules to the
newly adopted Maine Rules of Evidence, clarified problems concern-
ing district court appeals, and made provision for certain special
proceedings such as civil violations and separate support and cus-
tody in both the superior and district courts.81
2. Chief Justice
As Chief Justice, McKusick inherited a regime of procedural rules
and a mechanism for their development and adoption that he had
had a major hand in constructing. In his new role as head of Maine's
Judicial Department, he strengthened and expanded the court's use
of the advisory committee mechanism to assert the rulemaking
power in all areas of judicial authority, building on the model devel-
oped for the Civil Rules. Under his leadership, the existing Advisory
Committees on the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, and Rules of Evidence continued active," and new Advisory
Committees were established for the Rules of Probate Procedure,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. 5 In addition, the Board of Overseers of the Bar and the
Board of Bar Examiners were given the responsibility of functioning
as advisory committees for the Maine Bar Rules (other than the
Code of Professional Responsibility) and the Maine Bar Admission
Rules.56 In the civil realm, the rules committees produced new Rules
53. See Order effective Feb. 2, 1976, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
344-351 A.2d XXII, XXIV; Order effective Nov. 15, 1976, and advisory committee
notes, Me. Rptr., 360-366 A.2d XXI, XXXIV; and Order effective Apr. 15, 1975, and
advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 326-335 A.2d XXII, XLI.
54. See Orders of Feb. 8, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXIV-XXV; April 30,
1973, Mle. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XLIV-XLVL The continuity and membership of these
committees may be traced in annual appointment orders published in the front of the
Maine Reporter and, beginning in 1974, in the front of West Publishing Company's
annual Maine Rules of Court pamphlets.
55. The Maine Code of Professional Responsibility was developed by the Select
Commission on Professional Responsibility appointed by Order of Jan. 17, 1978, Me.
Rptr., 381-384 A.2d LXIX-LXX. Amendments to the Code are now the responsibility
of the Advisory Committee on the Code of Professional Responsibility established by
Order of Nov. 2, 1981. Me. Rptr., 434-440 A.2d XXXIII-XXXIV. The Maine Code of
Judicial Conduct was adopted by the Court on the recommendation of the Section on
Judicial Administration of the Maine State Bar Association. See Order of Feb. 26,
1974, Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XXXVII; Committee Notes on Code of Judicial Con-
duct, 8 MF. BAR Buiu, May 1974, at 1. Amendments are now the responsibility of the
Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct, established by Order of Sept.
6, 1989, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d CLXIV-CLXV. The Maine Rules of Probate Proce-
dure were adopted on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Probate
Rules, appointed in February 1980 and made permanent in 1981. See Order of Dec.
31, 1980, Me. Rptr., 418-427 A.2d XCI-XCIL
56. See M. Bar R. 4(d)(17); 4 M.R.S.A. § 801; M. Bar Adm. R. 4, 5, 9, 12, Board of
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of Probate Procedure, Administrative Court Rules, and Rules of
Small Claims Procedure, 57 in addition to carrying forward their fa-
miliar role of maintaining the balance of the Maine rules with their
federal models and the changing needs of Maine practice.55
Chief Justice McKusick also made use of the Maine Judicial
Council as a medium for procedural reform. Special committees of
the Council produced proposals for probate court reform and for an
experiment in the use of alternative dispute resolution in the supe-
rior court.5 9 Similarly, outside the mechanism of the Advisory Com-
mittees, the Chief Justice led the development of the Maine Court
Mediation Service, providing mandatory mediation in domestic rela-
tions cases involving children and optional mediation in other do-
mestic relations cases and all small claims cases.60
Not surprisingly, after McKusick became Chief Justice, amend-
ments in January 1978 and September 1980 (the latter promulgated
by the court without the aid of the Advisory Committee) made fur-
ther important changes in the provisions of the Civil Rules gov-
erning appeals to the Law Court.6 Further changes were also made
in the rulemaking process. In January 1980, the court adopted an
order abrogating its 1974 public comment order and establishing
more elaborate "Operating Procedures for Rulemaking" to be fol-
lowed by the Advisory Committees. Each committee was to report
annually to the court in February with any proposed amendments
and a summary of its proposals. The summary was to be distributed
to the public, and the court retained the option to conduct a public
hearing. Amendments would be received at other times if necessary,
but the purpose of the new procedures was to eliminate confusion by
consolidating all amendments in a single annual order. In a modifi-
cation of the Operating Procedures adopted in December 1981, com-
mittee annual reports were to be submitted on September 20th of
each year and any resulting amendments were to be promulgated by
Bar Examiners notes to 1990 amends., Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d CXLV-CXLVI.
57. See Order of Dec. 1, 1980, Me. Rptr., 418-427 A.2d XXXI (Maine Rules of
Probate Procedure); Order of June 26, 1978, Me. Rptr., 385-387 A.2d XXXI (Maine
Administrative Court Rules); Order of Oct. 20, 1982, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d XXX
(Maine Rules of Small Claims Procedure).
58. See infra notes' 100-104 and accompanying text. The court used a joint sub-
committee of the advisory committee on civil and criminal rules to prepare guidelines
implementing a two-year experiment with the use of cameras in trial courtrooms. See
order of Feb. 1, 1991, SJC No. 228; Order of July 8, 1991, SJC No. 228.
59. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF COURT STRUCTURE IN RELATION TO PROBATE AND
FAMILY LAW MATTERS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (Jan. 18, 1985). Regarding
the alternative dispute resolution study, see infra notes 224-27 and accompanying
text.
60. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
61. See Orders effective Jan. 3, 1978, Me. Rptr., 381-384 A.2d XIX, XXI, and
XXV, and Orders effective Sept. 1, 1980, Me. Rptr., 413-417 A.2d LII, LXVIII, and
LXXI.
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February 1st of the following year. The Operating Procedures re-
main in effect in this form.6
2
The first significant amendments under the new procedures were
adopted in August 1981, further clarifying the attachment rules and
adopting the current versions of the Federal Rules governing class
actions.13 Thereafter, substantial groups of amendments dealing
with all aspects of the Civil Rules have been promulgated each year
to take effect in February.6 Numerous amendment orders have also
been promulgated at other times of year under the emergency provi-
sions of the Operating Procedures.6
As a member of the Law Court, Chief Justice McKusick also con-
tributed to the development of Maine civil procedure. His opinions
on procedural matters clearly articulate the basic principle that the
Rules should be construed flexibly to do substantial justice. Those
opinions also reflect his own knowledge and experience gained in
Maine's rulemaking process and in his related professional
activities.6 "
62. See Order of Jan. 3, 1980, Me. Rptr., 409-412 A.2d XXI-XXIV, as amended
by Order of Dec. 16, 1981, Me. Rptr., 434-440 A.2d LXXX-LXXXIV.
63. See Order effective Aug. 6, 1981, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
428-433 A.2d XXXV, XLVIIL
64. See Order effective Feb. 1, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449458 A.2d LIU; Order effective
Feb. 15, 1983, Me. Rptr., 459-466 A.2d XLII; Order effective Feb. 1, 1984, Me. Rptr.,
467-478 A.2d XXXVI, LXIV; Order effective Feb. 15, 1985, Me. Rptr., 479.487 A.2d
LIX; Order effective Feb. 15, 1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XXLH, L; Order effective
Feb. 1, 1987, Me. Rptr., 510-521 A.2d XXXV; Order effective Feb. 15, 1987, Me.
Rptr., 510-521 A.2d LXXXI; Order effective Feb. 15, 1988, Me. Rptr., 522.536 A.2d
CCXI; Order effective Feb. 15, 1989, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XXXI; Order effective
Feb. 15, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXI; Order effective Feb. 1, 1991, Mle. Rptr.,
583(4) A.2d CXXXVI; and Order effective Feb. 15, 1991, Me. Rptr., 583(4) A.2d
CXX.
65. Order effective Mar. 15, 1982, Me. Rptr., 441-448 A.2d XXV; Order effective
Nov. 11, 1982, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d XXX; Order effective July 5, 1983, Me. Rptr.,
459-466 A.2d XXXVIII; Order effective July 25, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d XCV;
Order effective Aug. 1, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d CVII; Order effective July 25,
1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d CVIII; Order effective Mar. 22, 1985, Me. Rptr, 483-
497 A.2d XXIX; Order effective June 1, 1985, Me. Rptr. 488-497 A.2d XL; Order
effective May 1, 1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d CV; Order effective July 1, 1987, Me.
Rptr., 522-536 A.2d XXXI; Order effective Mar. 1, 1988, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d
CCXLIII; Order effective Sept. 1, 1988, Mle. Rptr., 537-550 A.2d XXXIX; Order ef-
fective July 1, 1989, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d CLVIII; Order effective May 1, 1990,
Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXXIV; Order effective May 8, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575
A.2d LXLVII; Order effective Mar. 1, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXXX; Order
effective July 1, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXXXII; Order effective May 8, 1990,
Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d CXLVIII; and Order effective Aug. 1, 1990, Me. Rptr., 576(3)
A.2d CXXXVIII, CXLL
66. For Law Court procedural decisions, see, e.g., LaBonta v. City of Waterville,
528 A.2d 1262 (Me. 1987) (proceeding to challenge zoning ordinance amendment erro-
neously brought under M.R. Civ. P. 80B treated as declaratory judgment action, be-
cause dismissal would violate principle of M.R. Civ. P. 1); Harriman v. Maddocks, 518
A.2d 1027 (Me. 1986) (claims adjusters' files presumed "prepared in anticipation of
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It is thus evident that, through all his varied responsibilities and
activities as active practitioner and chief justice, the development
and growth of the procedure by which civil disputes are heard and
resolved have been among Vincent McKusick's primary concerns.
The result of McKusick's efforts and focus is that Maine has a
strong and comprehensive body of court-made rules of widespread
application and effect that reflect the fact of his continuing national
involvement. Maine has been indeed fortunate to have had the ben-
efits of McKusick's leadership and intellect in the development of
its system of civil procedure.
II. THE MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: McKuSICK's LEGACY
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure as a continuing, growing body
are Vincent McKusick's legacy for Maine. The process by which the
Rules were initially developed and the history of their amendment
since 1959 demonstrates the potential and the limits of the judicial
rulemaking power. At the same time, the changing provisions of the
Rules illustrate the pressures and patterns that have affected Ameri-
can .courts in this period of turbulent national growth and change.
A. The Rules as Promulgated
1. The Federal Rules
The Maine Rules as promulgated in 1959 were an artful blending
of the federal model with provisions reflecting the demands of state
practice. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as originally adopted
litigation" and thus protected from discovery by M.R. Civ. P.26(b)(3) to avoid com-
plexity and delay in case-by-case determination of discoverability); Tisei v. Town of
Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me. 1985) (oral testimony at summary judgment hearing
motion, though taken contrary to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), treated as affidavits for purposes
of appeal by agreement of counsel); Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d 870 (Me. 1985) (ex
parte attachment upheld at subsequent dissolution hearing despite "sloppy" jurats;
arguably inadequate showing of ex parte need did not require new motion and no-
tice); Battryn v. Indian Oil Co., 472 A.2d 937 (Me. 1984) (sanctions against attorney
for failure to respond with objections to interrogatories under M.R. Civ. P. 33 upheld
with extensive reference to history and purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 37); Beegan v.
Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642 (Me. 1982) (affirming "transactional test" of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS to determine scope of cause of action for res judicata pur-
poses because Maine Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to bring all aspects and
theories of controversy before court); Sevigny v. Home Builders Ass'n of Maine, Inc.,
429 A.2d 197 (Me. 1981) (potential collateral estoppel effect, as defined in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, gave party standing to appeat judgment in its favor);
Reeves v. Travelers Ins. Companies, 421 A.2d 47 (Me. 1980) (upholding dismissal of
action for failure to comply with pretrial conference order to produce certain docu-
mentation, in light of purposes of discovery and pretrial rules to serve purposes of M.
R. Civ. P. 1 by assuring full disclosure before trial); Bagley v. Bagley, 415 A.2d 1080
(Me. 1980) (forum non conveniens does not deprive court entering judgment of juris-
diction to correct error under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS, and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS).
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were based on two cardinal premises that have remained unchanged:
Rule 1 provided that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 2
achieved the abolition of the common law forms of action and the
merger of law and equity by providing that "[t]here shall be one
form of action to be known as 'civil action.' ,,67
From that starting point, the Federal Rules established a system
of procedure that sought to encourage pretrial settlement and sim-
plify and focus trial or other disposition in those cases that could
not be settled. The function of issue formulation and narrowing was
shifted from detailed factual allegations and denials in the pleadings
to a more complex pretrial process that allowed notice pleading,
subject to counsel's undertaking that the claim could be supported,
and sought through a full range of discovery devices derived from
the equity practice to put all parties in equal possession of the facts
and theories upon which the case depended. 8 An optional pretrial
conference was provided as a forum in which the judge and the par-
ties together could assess the results of discovery, consider settle-
ment, and determine the issues actually to be tried and the course of
the trial. 9 The common law demurrer and plea in abatement were
replaced by an all-purpose motion to dismiss, and the pleadings
were rendered freely amendable on both formal and substantive
points.7 0
Liberal joinder provisions, also drawn from equity, meant that the
pleadings served primarily as a means for bringing before the court
all claims and parties related to the subject of the action, with power
in the court to consolidate or separate claims, parties, and actions
for trial as appropriate.7' The common law's forbidden "speaking
demurrer" was given legitimacy in the motion for summary judg-
ment based on affidavits and other written submissions.7 2 Various
equitable remedies were incorporated in streamlined form, and a
simplified version of the former statutory procedure for appeals to
the Courts of Appeal was provided.73 Simplified official forms of
summons, pleadings, and other necessary papers were appended to
the Rules and were, by a 1946 amendment, expressly declared to be
"sufficient under the rules and.., intended to indicate the simplic-
67. FED. 1L CIV. P. 1, 2. See generally C. WRIGHT. LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTs 523,
540 (4th ed. 1983); F. JAmS & G. HAzARD., supra note 1, at 21; C. CLARK. supra note
17, at 64-65.
68. See FED. 1R Civ. P. 7-12, 26-37 (1938).
69. See FED. 1. Civ. P. 16 (1938).
70. See FED. . Civ. P. 12(b), 15 (1938).
71. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13-14, 17-25, 42 (1938).
72. See FED. I. Cirv. P. 56 (1938); C. CLAIM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 541-44, 557-60 (2d ed. 1947).
73. See FED. . Civ. P. 64-76 (1938).
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ity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate. '7 4
2. The Maine Rules
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in 1959 incorpo-
rated eighty-one of the eighty-seven Federal Rules then in effect,
omitting a few provisions unique to federal practice such as rules
governing federal receiverships and condemnation proceedings.
Thirty-three Federal Rules were adopted without change, and the
variations in many of the rest were technical or were changes neces-
sitated by jurisdictional differences. In addition, Maine adopted
eleven unique rules covering attachment, arrest, replevin, real ac-
tions, review of administrative action, certain Law Court proceed-
ings, divorce and annulment, definitions, and admissions to the
bar.7 6 The Supreme Judicial Court promulgated twenty-four of the
thirty-two forms in the original federal Appendix of Forms with only
minor jurisdictional variations. Nine unique Maine forms covered
matters, such as writs of attachment, not found in the Federal
Rules. 7
Forty-three of the ninety-two Maine Rules of Civil Procedure in-
volved significant departures from prior Maine practice. In present-
ing the Rules to the bar at the January 1959 meeting, Professor
Field and Chairman Pierce had focused on three principal changes:
(1) law and equity were to be merged and the common law forms of
action abolished in favor of the single form of civil action as pro-
vided in Rule 2; (2) the time periods and deadlines of the Rules were
not to be tied to the beginning and ending dates of the statutory
terms of court in each county; and (3) appellate review was to be by
appeal in all cases, eliminating the technically cumbersome mode of
review by bill of exceptions in actions at law . 8 As in the Federal
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 84. The 1946 amendment of Rule 84 was intended to make
clear that "the forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient to withstand
attack under the rules under which they are drawn, and that the practitioner using
them may rely on them to that extent." See FED. R. Civ. P. 84 advisory committee's
note to 1946 amendment.
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64 (incorporation of state attachment rules), 66 (receiver-
ships), 71A (condemnation), 72 (Supreme Court appeals), 80 (stenographers), 83 (lo-
cal rules).
76. See M.R. Civ. P. 4A, 4B, 4C, 76A, 80A, 80B, and 87. In addition, a number of
unique Maine Rules were substituted for certain of the Federal Rules. See M.R. Civ.
P. 64 (Replevin), 72 (report to the Law Court), 80 (divorce), 83 (definitions).
77. The omitted federal forms dealt with matters unique to federal jurisdiction.
See FED. R. Civ. P. Appendix of Forms 2 (allegation of jurisdiction), 14-17 (federal
statutory actions), 28-29 (federal condemnation), 30 (suggestion of death upon the
record, adopted in Maine with 1966 amendment of M.R. Civ. P. 25, infra note 109).
The unique forms were M.R. Civ. P. Forms 2 (writ of attachment), 2A (trustee sum-
mons), Alts. 1, 2, 2A (for use in another county), 2B (return of service), 14 (writ of
replevin and bond), 21A (trustee's disclosure), 30 (writ of execution).
78. See FIELD, supra note 24, at 37-38; remarks of Leonard A. Pierce, in Field,
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Rules, the pleading, joinder, discovery, motion practice, and pretrial
rules also brought about major changes intended to encourage set-
tlement and simplify and focus the trial, and the simplified forms in
the Appendix of Forms were "sufficient under the rules." 0
Many elements of Maine practice survived, however. Among the
more significant departures from the federal model were the provi-
sion of Maine Rule 3 permitting an action to be commenced by ser-
vice of process, provisions in Maine Rule 4 requiring the plaintiff to
prepare and deliver the summons to the officer for service, elimina-
tion from Maine Rule 14(a) of the requirement of a motion for leave
to bring in a third-party defendant, creation of an exception in
Maine Rule 17(a) allowing a subrogated insurer to sue in the name
of the insured, inclusion in Maine Rule 33 of a limit on the number
of interrogatories permitted, the provision of Maine Rule 38 for trial
by jury in the absence of waiver, the provision of Maine Rule 41
allowing voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff at any time prior to
trial, the provision of Maine Rule 52 requiring findings of fact in a
nonjury case only upon request of a party, and the provision of
Maine Rule 62(e) making stay of execution automatic upon appeal.80
The Maine District Court Civil Rules as promulgated in 1962 were
reflective of the initially low jurisdictional ceiling of the district
court ($1,200 in 1961, increased to $10,000 in 1965). Thus the Dis-
trict Court Civil Rules incorporated many provisions of the Maine
Rules of Civil Procedure by reference, but omitted entirely rules
governing compulsory counterclaims, third-party practice, the pre-
trial conference, jury trial, and equitable remedies. Depositions and
interrogatories could be used only by agreement or leave of court.
Provisions were added to cover removal and appeal and proceedings
unique to the district court such as judicial separation and forcible
entry and detainer.1
3. The Rulemaking Process in Detail
We can better appreciate the process by which the Maine Rules
were developed by studying a single section of them in detail. To-
gether with Sanford lawyer James H. Titcomb, McKusick served on
the subcommittee charged with reviewing Federal Rules 38 through
53. These rules, constituting Part VI of the Federal Rules, contain
supra note 24, at 47; id. at 51-53, 89, 101-102.
79. M.R Civ. P. 84.
80. M.R. Civ. P. 3, MR. Civ. P. 4(b), M.R. Civ. P. 14(a), M.R. CiV. P. 17(a). M.R.
Civ. P. 33(a), M.RP Civ. P. 38(a), M.R. Civ. P. 41(a), M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), M.R. Civ. P.
62(e).
81. For the increase in the jurisdictional limits of the district court, Eee P.L. 1965,
ch. 236. For particular rules provisions, see M.D.C. Civ. R. 13, 26-37, 75-75, 80C, 80D.
See also M.D.C. Civ. R. 1, 2, committee's notes, 2 FELD. McKusicK & Womn. supra
note 24, at 419, 422.
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the provisions pertaining to trial. The work of the McKusick-Tit-
comb subcommittee, as documented in the several drafts described
in the preceding section, shows an approach emphasizing verbatim
adoption of the text of appropriate federal rules with few major
changes. Nevertheless, the Maine drafters were sensitive to the nu-
ances of Maine practice, and in important areas, such as the right to
jury trial and reference, substantial variations from the federal
model were proposed. Most of the subcommittee's recommendations
were adopted, with a few notable exceptions. The full committee
and the court also added provisions retaining prior practice at a
number of points. Since 1959, every one of the rules recommended
by the subcommittee has been amended, and substantial changes
have been made in nearly all of them.
8 2
A summary of the work of the subcommittee follows.
Rules 38, 39-Mode of Trial. Rules 38 and 39 deal with the right
to trial by jury and the manner of determining the mode of trial
when that right is absent or waived. Federal Rule 38 provides that a
party who claims the right to trial by jury must make a timely de-
mand for jury trial or be treated as having waived the right. In a
major change from the federal pattern, the McKusick subcommittee
recommended that Maine Rule 38 recognize the existing Maine
practice by providing that in a case where the right existed, jury
trial would be automatic unless affirmatively waived by all parties.
In the absence of such waiver, the court, on its own motion or on the
demand of a party, could find that there was no jury right and order
trial without jury. The subcommittee also proposed conforming
modifications in Rule 39. The subcommittee's draft of Rule 38 was
ultimately adopted by the court with only minor changes.8 " In
adopting Rule 39, the court omitted a sentence proposed in the sub-
committee draft of Rule 39(a) giving the trial court power to deter-
mine the order of trial of jury and nonjury issues and added a subdi-
vision (b) incorporating a prior statutory provision permitting
nonjury trials to be held anywhere in the state.8 4
82. For the subcommittee process, see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
83. M.R. Civ. P. 38 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendations, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-1 to IV-4. Maine eventually adopted the federal practice,
and other major changes were made in the jury system. See infra note 113 and ac-
companying text.
84. M.R. Civ. P. 39 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUr
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-4; BROWN BOOK, supra note 33, at 16. The order of trial
provision in Rule 39(a) was silently dropped prior to publication of the WHiTE BOOK,
supra note 32, presumably because of the potential constitutional issues involved in
determining the order of trial where both legal and equitable claims turn on the same
facts. These issues are discussed in 1 FiELD, McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24, at §
38.2. The statute incorporated in Rule 39(b) was R.S. ch. 107, § 30 (1959), repealed by
P.L. 1959, ch. 317, § 86 (effective December 1, 1959), which had made a similar provi-
sion for equity cases.
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Rules 40-42-Assignment, Prosecution, and Convenience of
Trial. Rules 40-42 contain provisions concerning the administration
of the docket and individual cases. For Rule 40, the subcommittee
recommended a provision that would carry forward the Maine prac-
tice of allowing different procedures for trial assignment in the dif-
ferent counties. This provision was promulgated by the court as the
first sentence of what became Rule 40(a). In Rule 40(b) and (c) the
court added language from the former Revised Rules of Court con-
cerning the time at which actions were to be in order for trial and
incorporated additional provisions of the Revised Rules concerning
continuances.8 5
In Rule 41(a), the Committee also recommended a departure from
the federal rule in recognition of Maine practice. Federal Rule
41(a)(1) allowed the plaintiff to dismiss an action unilaterally only
up until the time of service of the answer or a motion for summary
judgment. The subcommittee's recommendation, adopted by the
court, permitted voluntary dismissal at any time prior to trial."' The
subcommittee recommended the remainder of Federal Rule 41 with
only minor changes. Subsequently, Rule 41(b)(1), permitting the
trial court to dismiss an action on its own motion and without notice
for lack of prosecution after two years, was added to the draft and
adopted by the court.87
The subcommittee recommended adoption of Federal Rule 42,
permitting the court to consolidate or separate issues and actions for
trial. The proposal, which the court adopted, broadened the rule
into a flexible transfer of venue provision by permitting such trials
in any county and adding a subdivision (c) permitting an action to
be transferred to any county for trial in the interests of justice or for
the convenience of parties and witnesses.88
Rules 43-46-Trial Procedure. Rules 43-46 govern various proce-
dural aspects of the trial. The subcommittee recommended adoption
of Federal Rule 43 governing the admission of evidence, with varia-
tions primarily intended to reflect the differences between federal
and state practice. The proposal narrowed Maine practice by limit-
ing cross-examination of a party, or an officer of a party, called by
85. M.R. Civ. P. 40 (1959). For the subcommittee recommendations, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-4 to IV-5; GREEN BOOK, supra note 31, at 16; BROwN
BOOK, supra note 33, at 16.
86. M.P. Civ. P. 41(a)(1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-5 to IV-7. The federal procedure was eventually adopted
as part of the development of expedited pretrial procedure. See infra notes 116, 216
and accompanying text.
87. See BROWN BOOK, supra note 33, at 17-18. This procedure carried forward
existing practice. Id.
88. M.R. Civ. P. 42 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-7 to IV-9. Rule 42(c) was based on the federal transfer of
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). M.R. Civ. P. 42 reporter's note.
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an adverse party to the subject matter of the examination in chief.
The rule was promulgated substantially as proposed, with the addi-
tion of subdivisions (f)-(k) carrying forward evidentiary provisions
of the Revised Rules of Court.8 The subcommittee recommended,
and the court promulgated, a modification of Federal Rule 44 that
also changed Maine practice by eliminating the requirement of a
"double certificate" attesting to the authority of the custodian who
certifies a public record, when that record is kept within the state.90
The subcommittee recommended, and the court adopted, Federal
Rule 45, covering subpoenas, with certain changes reflecting Maine
practice.91
Rule 46, providing that exceptions were no longer necessary, was
viewed as one of the major changes brought about by the Rules,
eliminating what the proponents had decried as the empty and con-
fusing formalism that the word "exception" must be uttered at trial
by the objecting lawyer to save an error for appellate review and
that appellate review was limited to the matters listed in the bill of
exceptions. Rule 46 retained the requirement that the grounds of
objection be presented to the trial judge on the record, but, in con-
junction with major changes in the rules governing appeals, opened
the full record to review. The subcommittee recommended a varia-
tion of Federal Rule 46 based on what was characterized as the
clearer formulation found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51.
This recommendation was adopted with minor changes by the
court.92
Rules 47-50-The Jurors and Their Verdict. Rules 47-50 govern
the composition of the jury, general and special verdicts, and mo-
tions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The subcommittee
recommended adoption of Federal Rule 47, with its provision that
the trial court should conduct the voir dire, a significant change
from the Maine practice in which the lawyers had questioned pro-
spective jurors. The full committee's recommendation, which the
court adopted, gave the trial court the option of conducting the voir
89. M.R. Civ. P. 43 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-9 to IV-10; M.R. Civ. P. 43 reporter's note. For amend-
ments to eliminate inconsistencies or duplications with the Maine Rules of Evidence,
see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
90. M.R. Civ. P. 44 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-11 to IV-12.
91. M.R. Civ. P. 45 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-12-14.
92. See BLUE BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-14 to IV-15; Field, supra note 33, at 89;
1 FIELD, McKuSIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at § 46.2. M.R. Civ. P. 46 differs from
FED. R Civ P. 46 in omitting the word "formal" at the beginning of the first sentence
and in beginning the final clause of the rule with "but" rather than "and." Cf. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 51 (1944).
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dire.9" The subcommittee recommended, and the court adopted,
Federal Rule 48 permitting stipulations as to the size of the jury and
number of jurors necessary for a verdict.01 The subcommittee also
recommended adoption of Federal Rule 49 governing special ver-
dicts. This recommendation, which carried forward Maine practice,
was adopted by the court.9 5
In recommending adoption of Federal Rule 50 covering directed
verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict, the subcommit-
tee was proposing a significant change in Maine practice, under
which, after the erroneous failure to direct a verdict, the only availa-
ble relief was a new trial. Rule 50(b) allows the trial judge to reserve
decision on a directed verdict motion until after verdict and then
enter judgment on the verdict, enter judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or order a new trial, as appropriate. The court adopted the
subcommittee's recommendation. 6
Rules 51-52-Instructions and Findings. The subcommittee rec-
ommended adoption of Federal Rule 51 providing the procedure for
instructions to the jury and objection thereto. The principal change
for Maine practice was the provision that counsel were to be in-
formed of proposed instructions prior to arguing the case to the
jury. The court adopted the recommendation as Rule 51(b), adding
a new Rule 51(a) to carry forward the allocation of one hour per side
for closing argument from the Revised Rules of Court. 7
Federal Rule 52 requires the trial court to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in all nonjury cases. The subcommittee rec-
ommended adoption of this rule, which would have changed Maine
practice under which findings were required only upon request of a
party. The full committee recommended a revised version that
93. M.R. Civ. P. 47 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BooK, supra note 28, at IV-15 to IV-16. The rule also departed from the federal
model in incorporating provisions concerning alternate jurors based on existing prac-
tice. Id. See M.R. Civ. P. 47 reporter's note. For extensive changes concerning chal-
lenges and alternate jurors, see infra note 114 and accompanying text.
94. M.R. Civ. P. 48 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-16; M.R. Civ. P. 48 reporter's note. For amendments to
implement legislation changing the size of the jury and number required for a verdict,
see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
95. M.R. Civ. P. 49 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-16 to IV-18.
96. M.R. Civ. P. 50 (1959). For the subcommittee's recommendation, see BLUE
BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-18 to IV-22. The Rule as proposed and adopted contained
variations clarifying the federal rule, reflecting the fact that the standards for direc-
tion of the verdict and grant of a new trial in Maine are identical, and spelling out
the appropriate courses of action for the Law "Court. See M.R. Civ. P. 50 reporter's
note.
97. M.R. Civ. P. 51 and reporter's note (1959). For the subcommittee's recommen-
dation, see BLUE BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-22 to IV-23. For amendments making
the time for argument discretionary and permitting the court to sum up the evidence,
see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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would require findings only upon request, citing the administrative
burden that mandatory findings in every case would impose on un-
derstaffed judges. The court adopted the full committee's
recommendation."
Rule 53-Referees. Federal Rule 53 carried forward the rather
complex provisions of the prior federal equity rule governing refer-
ence to masters in equity cases. The subcommittee originally recom-
mended an adaptation of this rule to the traditional Maine practice
of reference of cases to one or more referees. After the full commit-
tee meeting, McKusick and Chairman Pierce prepared a redraft
designed to simplify the rule and preserve as much of the Maine
practice as possible. This version was adopted by the court with fur-
ther minor changes. 99
B. Amendments to the Maine Rules, 1959-1991: An Overview
One of the features emphasized by proponents of judicially
promulgated rules of procedure is the ease and flexibility with which
such rules can be amended to adapt to changing conditions or unex-
pected interpretations. 10 0 This premise is demonstrated by the
amendments which the United States Supreme Court and Congress
have made to the Federal Rules. In Maine, the Supreme Judicial
Court has been even more active and responsive to the needs of
bench, bar, and public.
Since 1938 the Federal Rules have been amended at relatively in-
frequent intervals. Principal changes adopted by the Supreme Court
have included amendments clarifying the procedure for multi-party
and class actions, adoption of a separate body of Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, substantial revisions to the discovery rules,
amendments intended to simplify service of process, and amend-
ments intended to police and penalize abuses of the Rules. 10 1 With
increasing complexity of the issues and higher jurisdictional
amounts, civil litigation in the federal courts has necessarily become
98. M.R. Civ. P. 52 (1959). For the subcommittee and committee recommenda-
tion, see BLUE BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-23; GREEN BOOK, supra note 31, at 17.
99. M.R. Civ. P. 53 (1959). For the subcommittee and committee recommenda-
tion, see BLUE BOOK, supra note 28, at IV-24 to IV-26; GREEN BOOK, supra note 31, at
17-18; WHITE BOOK, supra note 32, at 95-97. For numerous amendments made in the
operating details of the rule, see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
100. A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-93
(1949); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); R. MILLAR,
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952); C.CLARK,
supra note 72. See also C. CLARK, supra note 17 at 74-75.
101. For the various amendments, see 86 S. Ct. 173, 88A S. Ct. 2333, 90A S. Ct.
2357, 97 F.R.D. 165, 85 F.R.D. 521. See Order of Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966,
383 U.S. 1029-1070; Order of Dec. 4, 1967, effective July 1, 1968, 389 U.S. 1063-1120;
Order of March 30, 1970, effective July 1, 1970, 398 U.S. 971-1007; Order of April 28,
1983, 97 F.R.D. 165; and Order effective Aug. 1, 1980, 85 F.R.D. 521-544.
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more complex, and criticism of the Federal Rules as productive of
expense and delay continues to mount.102 Such criticism raises seri-
ous issues to be considered as well by those who are responsible for
the course of procedure in the state courts.
Since 1959, all but five of the original ninety-two Maine Rules of
Civil Procedure have been amended at least once, many of them
several times and in substantial ways. In addition, three rules have
been wholly abrogated and thirty-four new rules have been added.
The Maine District Court Civil Rules, also amended numerous times
since their original promulgation in 1962, were in 1987 merged with
the main body of Civil Rules, which were repromulgated in their
entirety. In this process, the Rules were rendered gender-neutral by
the elimination of masculine pronouns and other gender references.
Twelve of the thirteen original official forms were amended and
twenty-one new official forms were added between 1959 and 1989,
when the Appendix of Forms was completely revised.103
These extensive amendments and additions have kept the Rules
responsive to a variety of changing trends and pressures within and
upon the courts over the last thirty years. Amendments through
1970 were primarily intended to adjust the Rules to the practical
102. See generally 137 U. PA. L PRv. 1873 (1989) for a collection of articles assess-
ing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on their 50th anniversary. For specific criti-
cisms, see, e.g., Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA.
L Rav. 1883 (1989), and Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation:
A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment and Rule 11 Sanc-
tions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C.L REv. 1023 (1989). For
concerns that reforms might limit access to the courts see Weinstein, After Fifty
Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being
Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901 (1989); Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. lav. 2179 (1989); Weinstein, The Ghost
of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Erie, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1988). For concerns that flexibility be sacrificed for
uniformity see Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1969 (1989). See also Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-
Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L Rav. 2067 (1989). Rosen-
berg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U PA.
L RFv. 2197 (1989); Rosenberg, The Federal Rules after Half a Century, 36 MmI-E L
Rv. 243 (1984) (Author suggests that there is little empirical evidence with which to
evaluate the success or failure of the rules.).
103. The only rules so far unscathed in the amendment process are M.R. Civ. P.
2, 21, 61, 70, 85. The rules wholly abrogated are M.R. Civ. P. 4C, 87, 88. The rules
added are M.R. Civ. P. 16A, 17A, 23A, 44A, 54A, 54B, 74A-74C, 75A-75D, 76B-761,
80C-80L, 89-91. Fifteen of the added rules are the result of the merger of the Rules of
Civil Procedure and District Court Civil Rules. For the 1987 merger and repromulga-
tion, see Order of April 1, 1987, effective July 1, 1987, and advisory committee's
notes, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d XXXI-CCX. Conforming amendments were made to
the Maine Administrative Court Rules, the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure, and
the Maine Rules of Small Claims Procedure by Order of Jan. 21, 1988, effective
March 1, 1988, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A. 2d CCXLIII-CCLXXVI.
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realities of litigation or to adopt major Federal Rules amendments
in such areas as parties and discovery that were designed to assure
smoother operation of the existing system. In the second decade,
changes in the Rules began to reflect the rapid social and technolog-
ical change that was occurring in the society. Thus, in response to
constitutional and legislative mandates, major amendments have
been made in the rules governing attachments, the size and unanim-
ity of the jury, and divorce litigation. New rules have been added to
safeguard the right to trial by jury and provide procedure for such
legislatively created "civil actions" as the traffic infraction, the civil
violation, and the land-use violation. Increased pressures on the
courts have resulted in major changes in the rules governing admin-
istrative appeals, complex developments in the pretrial and appeals
rules, and the continued broadening of the procedure available in
the district court to reflect its increased jurisdiction.10 4
In the 1980's, and now in the 1990's, these trends have continued.
There is, however, a new emphasis on economy and efficiency, re-
flected in amendments increasing court control of the pretrial and
appellate processes and the development of procedural avenues be-
yond the scope of the rules, such as judicial assignment, alternative
dispute resolution, and new mechanisms to deal with domestic abuse
and support. Currently, further major rules changes are being con-
sidered in such areas as attachment, discovery, and divorce litiga-
tion, as earlier reforms begin to give way under the new pressures
for economy and efficiency.
These developments are summarized and documented in the fol-
lowing systematic survey of the principal changes in the Maine
Rules of Civil Procedure since 1959.
1. Process
Substantial changes have been made in the rules governing com-
mencement of the action and process. The purpose of the changes
was to broaden and clarify the methods of serving process and to
satisfy developing constitutional standards of notice and fairness.
These changes are discussed at length below.10 5
104. The jurisdictional level was increased to $30,000 by P.L. 1983, Ch. 275,
amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 152. In addition, the district court now has
concurrent jurisdiction over a variety of specific claims for equitable relief and other
specialized matters, including domestic relations, quiet title and foreclosure actions,
and enviromental law violations, as well as exclusive jurisdiction over matters such as
mental health commitment hearings and small claims. Id.
105. See infra notes 150-77 and accompanying text. In deference to changing of-
fice methods, the requirement in Rule 5(f) of a "backing" sheet on each document
filed has been eliminated, and the standard size of all papers to be filed has been
established at 81/2 by 11 inches. See M.R. Civ. P. 5(f) and advisory committee's note
to 1980 amend., 1 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 97, 98 (Supp. 1981).
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2. Pleadings and Parties
The basic provisions of Rules 8-10, 12, and 15 concerning the con-
tent and form of pleadings, the manner of presenting defenses and
objections, and the amendment of pleadings have undergone rela-
tively little change. 106 Rule 11 has been amended to include motions
as well as pleadings and its sanction has been changed from disci-
pline of the attorney to the imposition of reasonable costs upon the
party or the attorney or both.1 0 7
The rules concerning claims and parties have been refined and ex-
tensively elaborated. Thus, Rule 13 has been amended to establish
exceptions from the compulsory counterclaim rule for motor vehicle
cases and actions commenced by attachment and to make the rule
applicable in the district court. Third-party practice under Rule 14
is now also available in the district court.0 8 Rule 17 now provides
that a subrogated insurer may sue in the name of the insured only
after giving notice to the insured, and Rule 17A, providing a de-
tailed procedure for the settlement of minor's claims by a guardian
or other representative, has been added. 08 Rules 18, 19, 24, and 25
have been substantially revised to clarify the joinder of multiple
claims and to take the more functional approach of the Federal
Rules to joinder of parties. Federal Rules 23 and 23A, providing de-
tailed procedural guidelines for class actions and shareholders' de-
rivative suits, have been adopted virtually verbatim.110
106. M.R. Civ. P. 8-10, 12, 15. Rule 12 was amended in 1966 to clarify the provi-
sions for consolidation and waiver of defenses made by motion. See M.R. Civ. P.
12(g), (h), and explanation of 1966 amend., 1 FIELD. McKusicK & WOm, supra note
24, at 236-38, 240. Rule 15 was amended at the same time to provide for relation back
of amended pleadings bringing in a new party. See M.R. Civ. P. 15(c) and explana-
tion of 1966 amend., id. at 297-98, 300-01.
107. See M.R. Civ. P. 11 and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me.
Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LIII-LIV, LXI-LXII.
108. See M.R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b), and explanation of amend. to 1960, 1962, and
1966 amends., 1 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 259.61, 263-65; M.R.
Civ. P. 13(a), (j), and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me. Rptr., 522-536
A.2d LXVIII-LXIX; M.R. Civ. P. 14 and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend.,
Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d LXX-LXXI; M.D.C. Civ. R. 14 and advisory committee's
note to 1969 amend., 2 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 436-38.
109. See M.R. Civ. P. 17(c) and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend.. 1
FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 345, 346-48; M.R. Civ. P. 17A and
advisory committee's note to 1970 amend., 1 FIELD. McKusicK & WROTn, supra note
24, at 166-70 (Supp. 1981); 1988 amend. and advisory committee's note, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d CCXX-CCXXII, CCXXVIII-CCXXIX. On the amendment of Rule
17(c), see Wroth, supra note 47 at 72-78.
110. See M.R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 24, 25, and explanation of 1966 amends., 1 FmLD.
McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 358-59, 363-65, 398-99, 404-06; M.R. Civ. P.
23, 23A, and advisory committee's notes to 1981 amends., Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d
XL-XLII, L-LII.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
3. Pretrial Procedure
Substantial changes have been made in motion practice, discov-
ery, the pretrial conference, and case assignment with the dual, and
sometimes conflicting, goals of smoother functioning for the parties
and greater opportunity for judicial management of cases. These
changes are discussed at length below."'
4. Trial, Judgment, and Remedies
The drafting of Rules 38-53 covering trial has previously been de-
scribed in detail. 112 Substantial changes have been made in a num-
ber of these rules.
Extensive amendments to Rules 38, 39, 47, and 48 were necessary
to accommodate legislation changing the traditional requirement of
a unanimous verdict of a twelve-member jury to a three-quarters
majority of a jury of eight. In addition, Rule 38 now follows the Fed-
eral Rule in requiring a party desiring jury trial to include a jury
demand in the pretrial scheduling statement, in contrast to the orig-
inal Maine version of the rule under which jury trial was automatic
unless waived or opposed on the grounds that there was no right to
a jury."31 Elaborate provisions concerning challenges and the impan-
elment of alternate jurors, borrowed from a local Maine federal dis-
trict court rule, have been incorporated in Rule 47 to conform Maine
civil and criminal practice.
1 4
In other trial-related areas, Rule 44A covering proof of foreign law
has been added, the evidentiary provisions of Rules 43 and 44A were
amended for conformity with the Maine Rules of Evidence adopted
in 1976, a new version of Rule 44 governing proof of official records
111. See infra notes 178-228 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
113. For the amendments as to number and unanimity, see M.R. Civ. P. 38, 47,
48, and advisory committee's notes to 1973, 1975, and 1978 amends., 1 FIELD, McK-
USICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 272-77, 301-304, 306-308 (Supp. 1981). Initially,
the Legislature waffled between enabling the court to provide by rule for six- or eight-
member juries; the present legislation allows the court to provide by rule for trial by
six, seven, or eight jurors. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.14, § 1204, as amended by P.L.
1977, ch. 102. See P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 581, § 1. The provision for a
less than unanimous verdict is found in ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1354. The
provision for jury demand is similar to the practice under FED. R. Civ. P. 38. Despite
the waiver provision in the original Maine rule, a 1967 amendment to Rule 16 had
required a jury demand in the pre-trial memorandum. M.R. Civ. P. 38, 39, and advi-
sory committee notes to 1974 amends., 1 FIELD, McKusiCK & WROTH, supra note 24,
at 272-73, 275, 279-80. Subsequent amendments have been driven by the changing
framework of Rule 16. See M.R. Civ. P. 38 and advisory committee's note to 1988
amend., Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXXII-CCXXIII, CXXIX; M.R. Civ. P. 39 and
advisory committee's notes to 1986 and 1988 amends., Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XLII-
XLIII, XLVIII; Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXXIII, CCXXIX.
114. See M.R. Civ. P. 47 and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., 1 FIELD,
McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 634-37.
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has been adopted, and subpoenas under Rule 45 now may be issued
by a member of the bar.115 Rule 41(a)(1) has been amended to adopt
the federal practice under which voluntary dismissal is permitted
only until the time for answer or motion for summary judgment.110
In an important clarification, the provisions of Rule 41(b)(2) gov-
erning the motion for judgment at the close of the plaintiff's evi-
dence in a nonjury cases have been consolidated with the directed
verdict provisions of Rule 50.117
The time-honored hour originally allowed each party for closing
argument in the superior court under Rule 51 has been abandoned
in favor of allowing the trial judge discretion as to the time for argu-
ment, and a provision stating the existing rule that the trial judge
may sum up the evidence but may not comment on its weight was
added to Rule 51 in conjunction with adoption of the Maine Rules
of Evidence. s18 Rule 52 has been amended to conform to statute by
making findings mandatory in every termination of parental rights
case.
1 19
115. See M.R. Civ. P. 43, 44, 44A, and advisory committee's notes to 1966 and
1976 amends., 1 FIELD. McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 593-94, 604-06, 614; id.
at 289-91, 295-96 (Supp. 1981). With the adoption of Maine Rule of Evidence 902(1)
permitting the admission of any domestic public document under seal without extrin-
sic evidence, the requirement of double certification was effectively eliminated be-
cause Evidence Rule 902(1) is a means of proof incorporated under M.R. Civ. P.
44(c). See 1 FLD, McKUSICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 294-295 (Supp. 1981). The
change in Rule 45 reflects the fact that the powers of a notary, which include those of
a justice of the peace, may now by statute be exercised by a member of the bar. See
M.R_ Civ. P. 45(a) and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me. Rptr. 510-521
A.2d LXXXV, XCIII.
116. See M.R_ Civ. P. 41(a)(1) and advisory committee's note to 1989 amend.. Me.
Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XXXV-XXXVI. The amendment changed the result of a Law
Court decision in which a voluntary dismissal filed without prior notice at 9:00 a.m.
on the day on which jury selection was to begin was upheld. Id. at XXXVI (citing
Hall v. Norton, 549 A.2d 372 (Me. 1988)).
117. See M.R. Civ. P. 50(d) and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me.
Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LV, LXIII. Conforming changes were made in Rules 41(b)(2) and
52(a). Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d at LIV, LV, & LXII. A similar amendment to Federal
Rule 41 and 52 is currently under consideration by the Supreme Court. See FEDERAL
Crvm JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RuLEs 133 (West 1991). Rule 41(b)(1) %as amended in
1969 to require notice for involuntary dismissal for lack of prosecution. See M.R. Civ.
P. 41 advisory committee's note to 1969 amend., 1 FIELD, McKusicN & WoT, supra
note 24, at 572. Rule 50 was also amended in 1966 to incorporate clarif)ing changes
made in 1963 amendments to the Federal Rule. M.R. Civ. P. 50, explanation of 1966
amend., 1 FIELD, McKusicK & WaoTH, supra note 24, at 660.
118. See M.R. Civ. P. 51(a) and advisory committee's note to 1988 amend., Me.
Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXXIII, CCXXX; M.R. Civ. P. 51(c) and advisory committee's
note to 1976 amend., 1 FIELD. McKuscK & WRoTH, supra note 24, at 317-18 (Supp.
1981).
119. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) and advisory committee's note to 1989 amend., Me.
Rptr., 551-562 A2d XXXVI. Rule 52(a) was also amended in 1975 to make clear that
after findings the original judgment entered still controls unless the findings require
it to be changed. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) and advisory committee's note to 1975
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The provisions of Rule 53 concerning reference have been
amended a number of times to broaden the court's discretion re-
garding compensation of the referee, to eliminate the required filing
of a transcript with the report, to simplify the procedure for raising
and determining objections to the report, and to provide a proce-
dure for amendment of the report. Reference has also been made
available in the district court, but further efforts to broaden the pro-
cedure to increase its use as an alternative dispute resolution device
have been unavailing.120 Few major changes have been made in
Rules 54-63 covering judgment and related topics. Pursuant to spe-
cial enabling legislation, the court added Rules 54A and 54B to set
filing and other fees for the superior and district courts that had
previously been set by statute. Entry fees are now $100 for the Law
Court and superior court and $50 for the district court.121 Amend-
ments to the summary judgment procedure of Rule 56 are discussed
below.' 12 Rule 59 has been amended to clarify the power of the court
to grant a new trial on its own motion, to make provision for the
death or disability of the court reporter, and to condition the grant
of a new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages on
the prevailing party's rejection of the opportunity to remit or add a
reasonable amount to the verdict. 123
amend., 1 FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 324-25 (Supp. 1981).
120. See M.R. Civ. P. 53 and explanation of 1960, 1961, amends., 1 FIELD, McK-
USICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 693-96; advisory committee's notes to 1975, 1977,
and 1980 amends., id. at 333-36 (Supp. 1981); advisory committee's note to 1981
amend., Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XLIII, LII-LII; advisory committee's note to 1991
amend., 583 A.2d No. 4 at CXXIV, CXXXI (advance sheet). For efforts to broaden
the rule, see ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 4.
121. See M.R. Civ. P. 54A, added effective Sept. 14, 1979, Me. Rptr., 401-404 A.2d
XXVI-XXVII; M.D.C. Civ. R. 54A, added effective Sept. 14, 1979, Me. Rptr., 401-404
A.2d at XXV-XXVI. The enabling legislation was P.L. 1979, ch. 425, §§ 1, 2; ch. 663,
§ 10, amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 175, 555. District Court Civil Rule 54A
became Rule 54B in the amendments merging the superior and district court rules.
See M.R. Civ. P. 54B and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me. Rptr., 522-
536 A.2d CXXIX. The court has exercised its power to set fees by numerous amend-
ments of these rules. See M.R. Civ. P. 54A, M.D.C. Civ. R. 54A, amends. effective
Oct. 15, 1979, Me. Rptr., 405-408 A.2d XXI-XXIII; effective April 1, 1983, Me. Rptr.,
449-458 A.2d CXVI-CXVII; effective June 1, 1985, Me. Rptr., 488-497 A.2d XL, XLI;
effective May 1, 1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d CV, CVI; effective March 1, May 1,
and May 8, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXXIV-LXXXI; effective Aug. 1, 1990,
576 A.2d No. 3 at CXXXVIII, CXXXIX (advance sheet). Rules 54A and 54B were
also amended to provide that neither the state nor any state agency was required to
pay any of the fees contained in those rules. See M.R. Civ. P. 54A, 54B, and explana-
tion of 1989 amends., Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d CLVIII-CLX. In a recent administra-
tive order, the court has established a new civil jury fee of $300. Order of Jan. 30,
1991, effective Feb. 1, 1991, 583 A.2d No. 4 at CXXXVI-CXXXVII (advance sheet).
122. See infra notes 185 and accompanying text.
123. See M.R. Civ. P. 59(a), (d), (f), and explanation of 1961 and 1966 amends.,
advisory committee's note to 1969 amend., 2 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note
24, at 53-58.
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There have also been relatively few changes to Rules 64-71 gov-
erning remedies. Amendments of Rule 64 to deal with constitutional
issues concerning the procedure for replevin are considered below.12'
Rule 65 covering injunctions has been amended to increase the
court's flexibility in dealing with preliminary and final hearings and
to strengthen the assurances which must be made regarding efforts
to give notice of an application for a temporary restraining order.
The rule has been made applicable in the district court in view of
the increase in that court's equity jurisdiction. 25 The offer-of-judg-
ment procedure of Rule 68 was amended to permit an offer to be
made on the issue of damages after liability has been resolved and
to permit the court to allow an offer within 10 days of trial, but
other efforts to expand the procedure have failed.'2 0 Rule 69 gov-
erning executions has been amended to make all discovery devices
available in aid of the statutory disclosure procedure and to reflect
constitutional concerns by allowing capias executions to issue only
on court order for cause.' 27
5. Appeals
Rules 72-76A governing appeals to the Law Court have been sub-
stantially changed to simplify and shorten the procedure and in-
crease Law Court supervisory control of the appellate docket. These
changes are discussed at length below.128
Rules 76C-76I have been added to carry forward the provisions of
the former District Court Civil Rules governing removal and appeals
to the superior court. Those rules had been amended numerous
times for purposes such as to eliminate de novo trial on appeal from
a district court default judgment, to eliminate removal by plaintiff
except in limited situations, to clarify the respective powers of the
124. See infra note 172.
125. See M.R. Civ. P. 65 and explanation of 1966 amend., advisory committee's
note to 1967 amend., 2 FIELD & McKusicK, supra note 24, at 103-106; advisory com-
mittee's note to 1976 amend., id. at 386-88 (Supp. 1981); amend. effective Jan. 3.
1978, Me. Rptr., 381-384 A.2d XIX-XX; M.D.C. Civ. R. 65 and advisory committee's
note to 1983 amend., Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LIX, LXVI.
126. See M.R Civ. P. 68 and explanation of 1966 amend., advisory committee's
note to 1967 amend., 2 FIELD & McKuSicK, supra note 24, at 120-21. For the unsuc-
cessful efforts, see ADvISORY CohaMnrrts ON CIVIL RULES. 1983 ANNuAL REPoRT 6; Sup-
PLErENTAL REPORT 2 (Nov. 1989).
127. See M. a Civ. P. 69 and explanation of 1959 amend., 2 FILD. McKusicK &
WROTH, supra note 24, at 125; advisory committee's notes to 1970 and 1971 amends.,
id. at 392-94 (Supp. 1981); advisory committee's note to 1988 amend., hie. Rptr., 522-
536 A.2d CCXXIII-CCXXIV, CCXXX. For the the disclosure law as substantially
revised by P.L. 1987, ch. 184, see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 3120-3136 (1980 &
Supp. 1990); Calkins, The New Disclosure Statutes, 2 M. BA,. J 350 (1987). As to
the constitutionality of capias execution, see 2 FIELD. McKusIcK & WVnom, supra
note 24, at 396-98.
128. See infra notes 22945 and accompanying text.
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superior and district courts in the removal and appeal process, to
provide for electronic sound recording in district court proceedings,
to cover direct appeals to the Law Court, and to conform in various
ways to other rules amendments. 1 9 The rule governing removal has
been completely revised to clarify its operation and applicability. 30
6. Courts and Clerks
The rules governing the operations of the court and the clerks'
offices have been amended in a number of respects to simplfy opera-
tions and to reflect the changing administrative structure of the Ju-
dicial Department.13 1
7. Special Proceedings
Rule 80, providing special procedures for actions for divorce and
annulment has been amended on numerous occasions to reflect
changing views of those actions and the increased complexity of do-
mestic relations proceedings. Thus the original rule has been
amended to make clear that its provisions may apply to either
spouse, to accommodate legislation concerning disposition of marital
property, to establish the finality of a judgment of divorce and other
orders notwithstanding other pending claims, and to permit discov-
129. See M.D.C. Civ. R. 73-76 and explanation of Jan. 1967 amend.; M.D.C. Civ.
R. 73 advisory committee's note, Dec. 1967, 2 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra
note 24, at 486-87; M.D.C. Civ. R. 73 advisory committee's notes, May 1974, Apr.
1975, Dec. 1975, Feb. 1976, and Nov. 1976, id. at 650-53 (Supp. 1981); M.D.C. Civ. R.
73 Supreme Judicial Court's note, Sept. 1980, id. at 653; M.D.C. Civ. R. 73 advisory
committee's note, 1982 and 1984, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LXVI and Me. Rptr., 467-
478 A.2d LXXVI; M.D.C. Civ. R. 75 advisory committee's note, Jan. 1974, 2 FIELD,
McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 659 (Supp. 1981); M.D.C.Civ. R. 75 advisory
committee's note, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXXVI-LXXVII; M.D.C. Civ. R.
75A advisory committee's note, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d LVII; M.D.C. Civ. P.
76 advisory committee's note, Jan. 1974 and Nov. 1976, 2 FIELD, McKusicK & WROTI!,
supra note 24, at 664-67 (Supp. 1981); M.R. Civ. P. 76C-761 advisory committee's
notes, 1987, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CLXIII-CLXIX; M.R. Civ. P. 76H advisory
committee's note, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXIII.
130. See M.R. Civ. P. 76C and advisory committee's note, 1991, 583 A.2d No. 4 at
CXXV-CXXVI, CXXXI-CXXXII (advance sheet).
131. See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 6(a), 77(c), and advisory committee's notes, 1974, 1
FIELD & McKusIcK, supra note 24, at 99-100, 543 (chief justice, rather than county
commissioners, to determine hours and days on which clerks' offices open); explana-
tion of 1984 amends., Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d XXXVI, XXXVIII (substituting
"Chief Justice of Superior Court" for "Chief Justice of Supreme Judicial Court," re-
flecting establishment of former office by P.L. 1983, ch. 269 (enacting ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4 § 101A)); M.R. Civ. P. 78 and advisory committee's note to July 1987
amend., Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CLXX-CLXXI (empowering the chief justice of the
superior court and the chief judge of the district court, rather than the chief justice of
the Supreme Judicial Court, to establish motion days); M.R. Civ. P. 79(b) advisory
committee's note, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LVII, LXV (deleting provision con-
cerning maintenance of extended records of judgments).
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ery without court order on financial and property issues.132 Provi-
sions added to Rule 80 cover post-judgment motions, transfer from
the superior to the district court, an exception to the pretrial confer-
ence rule, filing of property lists, and removal from the district
court.'ss More recently, procedure in cases involving child support
has been governed by child support guidelines and forms adopted by
administrative order and statute. A general revision of Rule 80 is
currently under consideration.1
3 4
The rules governing superior court review of state and local gov-
ernmental action have been extensively amended, with the abolition
of the common law writs of certiorari and mandamus, the develop-
ment of elaborate procedures in Rule 80B for nonstatutory review,
and the promulgation of Rule 80C to cover review under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act."3 5 Rule 80D, covering district court forcible
entry and detainer actions, has been substantially amended to re-
flect a Law Court decision that there is a right to appeal with jury
132. See M.R. Civ. P. 80 and advisory committee's note, 1967, 2 FILD. McKusic
& WROTH, supra note 24, at 265-67, 271; advisory committee's note, 1977, id. at 547,
554 (Supp. 1981); advisory committee's note, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XLIV,
LIII-LIV; advisory committee's note, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXV, LXXIV.
133. See M.R. Civ. P. 80 and explanation of 1960 and 1962 amends., 2 FlE.,
McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 267, 270-71; advisory committee's note, 1970,
id. at 547-51 (Supp. 1981); advisory committee's note, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d
XLIV, LIV; advisory committee's note, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LVII, LXIV,
LXII; advisory committee's note, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXV, LXXIV; advi-
sory committee's note, July 1987, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CLXXIV; advisory com-
mittee's note, 1988, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CXXIV, CXXX. A provision for in
forma pauperis proceedings added in 1972 was deleted when Rule 91, a general rule
for in forma pauperis proceedings, was adopted in 1984. See M.R. Civ. P. 80(1) and
advisory committee's notes, 1972 and 1980, 2 FILD. McKusicK & WROTH, supra note
24, at 548, 551-53, 555 (Supp. 1981); advisory committee's note, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-
478 A.2d LXV, LXXIV. For discussion regarding Rule 91, see infra note 149.
134. See Henry, Child Support Guidelines Now Mandatory in Judicial Proceed-
ings, 4 ME. BAR J. 356 (1989); Order of Oct. 5, 1989, effective Oct. 12, 1989 (No. SJC-
13); M. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 311-319 (Supp. 1990), enacted by P.L 1989, ch.
834, Pt. A; Order of July 20, 1990, effective Aug. 19, 1990, 576 A.2d No. 3 at CXLIII-
CXLVIII (advance sheet); Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of Meeting of
July 25, 1991, at 1-2.
135. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B, 81(c), and advisory committee's notes, 1967, 2 FELD.
McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 302-306, 322, 326-29; advisory committee's
note, 1975, 2 FIELD. McKusiCK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 563-64 (Supp. 1981); advi-
sory committee's note, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428433 A.2d XLIV-XLVI, LIV-LVI; advisory
committee's note, Feb. 1, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LVIII, LXV; amend. effective
Feb. 15, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d CV-CVIII; advisory committee's note, Feb. 15,
1983, Me. Rptr., 459-466 A.2d XLII-XLVII; advisory committee's note, 1984, Me.
Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXVI, LXXV; advisory committee's note, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-
575 A.2d XXXII-XXXI, LXIII; MR. Civ. P. 80C and advisory committee's note to
1983 promulgation, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d CVIII-CXI; 459-466 A.2d XLVII-XLIX;
advisory committee's note, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXVI, LXXV; advisory
committee's note, 1990, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXIII, LXHL See generally
Wroth, supra note 47, at 86-92.
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trial de novo in such actions.13 6
Since 1959, eight rules covering particular special proceedings in
the superior and district courts have been added, illustrating the di-
versity and complexity of the uses to which civil procedure is cur-
rently put. These provisions now constitute Rules 80E-80L of the
merged Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. The special rules cover pro-
ceedings for administrative inspection warrants, 137 traffic infrac-
tions,"' separate support and custody,139 civil violations,1 40 search
warrants for Schedule Z drugs,24 warrants for surveys and tests,1 43
land use violations, 143 and constitutionally required jury trial de
novo of small claims appeals. 144
136. See M.R. Civ. P. 80D and advisory committee's note to 1990 amend., Me.
Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXIII-XXXV, LXIII-LXV. The decison was North School
Congregate Housing v. Merrithew, 558 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1989). A number of minor
amendments had been made to the predecessor district court rule. See M.D.C. Civ. R.
80D and advisory committee's notes to 1967, 1969, and 1974 amends., 2 FIELD, McK-
USICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 505-507; id. at 673-74 (Supp. 1981).
137. See Order effective July 1, 1987, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d XXXI, CLXXXIII-CLXXXIV.
138. See Order effective July 1, 1987, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d XXXI, CLXXXIV-CLXXXV; amended effective Feb. 15, 1990, and ad-
visory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXI, XXXV-XXXVI, and LXV.
LXVI; amended effective Feb. 15, 1991, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 583
A.2d No. 4 at CXX, CXXVI-CXXVII, and CXXXII (advance sheet).
139. See Order effective Nov. 15, 1976, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
360-366 A.2d XXI, XXII-XXIV, XXXVI-XXXVIII; amended effective Feb. 1, 1984,
Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXIV, LXVI; amended effective July 1, 1990, Me. Rptr.,
563-575 A.2d LXXXII-LXXXIII, with advisory committee notes at LXXXIV;
amended effective Feb. 15, 1991, Me. Rptr., 583(4) A.2d CLXXXV-CLXXXVII.
140. See Order effective Nov. 15, 1976, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
360-366 A.2d XXI, XXIV-XXV, XXX-XXXI, XXXVIII-XXXIX and XLI; amended
effective Feb. 1, 1983, Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LIII-LXVII; amended effective Feb.
15, 1986, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XLII, XLVI, and L;
amended effective July 1,1987, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CLXXXVII-CLXXXIX;
amended effective Feb. 15, 1990, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 563-575
A.2d XXXI, XXXVI-XXXVII, and LXVI; amended effective Feb. 15, 1991, and ad-
visory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 583(4) A.2d CXX, CXXVII, and CXXXIII.
141. See Order effective Nov. 15, 1976, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
360-366 A.2d XXI, XXVI, and XXXIX; amended effective July 1, 1987, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d XXXI, CLXXXIX.
142. See Order effective July 1, 1987, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CLXXXIX-CXC.
143. See Order effective July 1, 1987, Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CXC-CXCII;
amended effective Feb. 15, 1990, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 563-575
A.2d XXXI, XXXVII-XXXVIII, and LXVI-LXVII.
144. See Order effective Feb. 15, 1986, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
498-509 A.2d LI, LIII-LV, and LVIII-LXI; amended effective July 1, 1987, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d XXXI, CXCIII-CXCV; amended effective Feb. 15, 1990, and advisory
committee notes, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXI, XXXVIII, and LXVII. As to the
right to jury trial, see Ela v. Pelletier, 495 A.2d 1225 (Me. 1985).
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8. Forms
Amendments to Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms between 1959
and 1990 included efforts to restate the various forms of summons
and writs in plainer language, amendments to accommodate the pro-
cess forms to changes in the attachment rules, and changes to con-
form discovery forms to the 1970 amendments of the discovery
rules. 45 The 21 new forms added between 1959 and 1990 covered
divorce and protection from abuse, changes in the attachment and
discovery rules, witness subpoenas, and miscellaneous other mat-
ters.146 With the increasing administrative supervision of the prac-
tice and the merger of the superior and district court rules, the ap-
proach of the original Rule 84 declaring the official forms
"sufficient" has been abandoned. An entirely new and reorganized
Appendix of Forms containing only twenty-nine basic forms for both
145. Form 1 amended effective Sept. 1, 1960, 156 Me. Rptr. 556 and amended
effective Sept. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XXII, XXVI.XXVIII; Alternate
Form 1 amended effective Sept. 1, 1960, 156 Me. Rptr. 556 and amended effective
Sept. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XXII, XXVII-XXIX; Form 1E amended effec-
tive Aug. 7, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXV, XLVII, and LXI; Form 2 amended
effective Jan. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX-XX and amended effective Aug.
1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XIX-XXI; Alternate Form 2 amended effective Jan.
1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX-XX and amended effective Aug. 1, 1973, Me.
Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XIX-XXI; Form 2A amended effective Jan. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr.,
293-299 A.2d XIX-XX and amended effective Feb. 15, 1986, Me. Rptr., 493-509 A.2d
XLI, XLIV-XLV; Alternate Form 2A amended effective Jan. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-
299 A.2d XIX-XX; Form 2C amended effective Dec. 31, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237
A.2d LXVII and abrogated Sept. 23, 1971, Me. Rptr., 276-284 A.2d XLX, XXIII; Al-
ternate Form 2C amended effective Feb. 7, 1968, Me. Rptr., 237 A.2d XXIV and
abrogated Sept. 23, 1971, Me. Rptr., 276-284 A.2d XIX, XXIII; Forms 2D-2G
amended effective Aug. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 300-307 A.2d XIX-XXI; Form 14
amended effective Jan. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XLX-XX; Form 21A
amended effective Feb. 15, 1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XLII, XLV.XLVI; Form 22
amended effective Aug. 1, 1962, 158 Me. Rptr. 604-605 and amended effective Jan. 18,
1974, Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XVII, XX-XXII; Form 24 amended effective Oct. 1,
1970, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XXXV-XXXVII; Form 30 amended effective Nov. 23,
1965, 161 Me. 696; and M.R. Civ. P. 84 amended effective July 1, 1987, Me. Rptr.,
522-536 A.2d XXXI, CXCVIII.
146. Form 1D, effective Jan. 18, 1974, Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XVII, XIX-XX;
Form 1E, effective July 3, 1980, Me. Rptr., 413-417 A.2d XXX-XXXI; Form 2C, ef-
fective Dec. 31, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXVII, LIX; Alternate Form 2C, effec-
tive Dec. 31, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXVII, LIX; Forms 2D-2G, effective Jan.
1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX-XX, XXXI-XXXIII; Form 13A, effective Aug.
7, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXV, XLVII, LXV-LXVI; Forms 14A-14D, effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1973, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX-XXI, XXXIII-XXXV; Form 15, effec-
tive Apr. 15, 1975, Me. Rptr., 326-335 A.2d XXII, XXIX; Form 16, effective Apr. 15,
1975, Me. Rptr., 326-335 A.2d XXII, XXIX, XXXI; Form 17, effective Feb. 15, 1985.
Me. Rptr., 479-487 A.2d LIX, LXI-LXII; Form 31, effective Nov. 1. 1966. Me. Rptr.,
215-224 A.2d XXI, XLIII; Form 32, effective Dec. 31, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d
XXVII, LXI; Form 33, effective May 9, 1970, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XXXII; Form
34, effective Aug. 7, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXV, XLVII, and LVIII-LX;
Form 35, effective Aug. 7, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXV, XLVII. and LXII.
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superior and district courts was adopted in 1990. Rule 84 now ex-
pressly provides that the new forms are "examples" only and that
the Supreme Judicial Court and the chief judges of the two trial
courts have power to promulgate "official forms" from time to
time."
9. Other General Provisions
Rules 87 and 88, covering admission to the bar and contingent
fees, respectively, were abrogated in 1978 because their provisions
were incorporated in the Maine Bar Rules adopted in that year.148
Since 1959, rules have been adopted to cover the withdrawal of an
attorney from representation in litigation, the admission of visiting
lawyers, supervised practice by third-year law students representing
public agencies or indigent clients, and proceedings in forma
pauperis. 4 9
C. The Amendment Process in Detail: Three Examples
A clearer idea of the uses of the amendment process and the
changing patterns of the Maine Rules over the years can be gained
by systematic and detailed examination of amendments in three key
areas of procedure: process at the commencement of a civil action,
pretrial practice, and appellate practice.
1. Commencement of Action: Rules 3, 4, 4A, 4B, 4C
Adoption of the rules in 1959 made a major change in the method
of commencing an action, which under prior Maine practice had
been by service of the writ upon the defendant personally, or more
frequently by attachment of property, and occasionally by arrest of
the defendant's person. Rule 3, combining the federal provision for
147. See M.R. Civ. P. 84 and advisory committee's notes to 1987 and 1990
amends., Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CXCVIII; Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXVIII,
LXVII; M.R. Civ. P. Appendix of Forms (1990) and advisory committee's note, Me.
Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXVIII-LXII, LXVII-LXVIII. In 1991, Form 11.20, Witness
Subpoena for Trial, was amended and a new Form 3.20 to implement the simultane-
ous amendments of Rule 4, infra note 157, was added. See M.R. Civ. P. Forms 3.20,
11.20, and advisory committee's notes to 1991 amends., 583 A.2d No. 4, at CXXXIII
(advance sheet).
148. See M.R. Civ. P. 87, 88, 2 FIELD. McKusiCK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 598,
601 (Supp. 1981). Order effective Nov. 1, 1978, Me. Rptr., 389-391 A.2d XXIV.
149. See M.R. Civ. P. 89 and advisory committee's note to 1967 promulgation, 2
FIELD, McKusiCK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 365; M.R. Civ. P. 89 advisory commit-
tee's notes to 1971 and 1973 amends., id., at 601-03 (Supp. 1981); M.R. Civ. P. 90 and
advisory committee's note to 1969 promulgation, id., at 368-70 (2d ed. 1970); M.R.
Civ. P. 90 explanation of 1976 amend., advisory committee's note to 1980 amend., id.,
at 605-08 (Supp. 1981); M.R. Civ. P. 90 advisory committee's note to 1988 amend.,
Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXXV, CCXXXI; M.R. Civ. P. 91 and advisory commit-
tee's note to 1984 promulgation, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXVI-LXVII, LXXV-
LXXVI.
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commencement by filing the complaint with an option for com-
mencement by service of the summons and complaint, eliminated
attachment and arrest as a means of commencing or giving notice of
the action.150 Rule 4 provided for notice through service of a sum-
mons and complaint personally within or without the state, or by a
variety of means of substituted service.1 51 Rules 4A, 4B, and 4C pre-
served the remedies of attachment and arrest as ancillary to the
commencement of the action and the service of the summons and
complaint. 52
The numerous changes made in these rules since 1959 have had
two basic purposes: (1) to expand and simplify the means of serving
the summons and complaint, consistent with developing constitu-
tional doctrines of due process; and (2) to shape the rules covering
attachment and arrest to limits imposed by consumer-oriented legis-
lation and perceived constitutional mandate. The amendments to
these rules illustrate the flexibility with which rules of court can be
adapted to changing constitutional and legislative requirements.
Rule 3. Rule 3 continues to provide the alternative options of fil-
ing and service for commencement of the action for the all-impor-
tant purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. 5 3 A 1973 amend-
ment was designed to complement simultaneous amendments of
Rules 4A and 4B, requiring commencement by filing in actions in-
volving the use of attachment and making provision for service of
the writ and return on defendant.15
Rule 4. Rule 4 has been amended more than a dozen times since
1959.155 Nine of these amendments were intended to expand or clar-
ify the means of making personal service provided in Rule 4(d). The
purpose of these changes has ordinarily been to identify the individ-
ual or office upon whom or which service should be made and to
150. See M.R. Civ. P. 3 and reporter's notes (1959); FED. R Cv P. 3.
151. M.R Civ. P. 4 and reporter's notes (1959).
152. M.I& Civ. P. 4A, 4B, 4C, and reporter's notes (1959).
153. See M.R. Civ. P. 3 and reporter's notes; I FIELD. McKusicK & Wotomi, supra
note 24, § 3.0. Amendments have made clear that, whichever method is used, plaintiff
must complete the process within fixed deadlines. See Order effective Dec. 31, 1967,
and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXVII, XXIX, and 1 FI.LD.
McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 40; Order effective Feb. 15, 1989, and advisory
committee notes, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XXXI, XXXIV-.XXXV.
154. The amendments added the phrase "except as otherwise provided in these
rules," at the beginning of the rule and eliminated language specifically concerning
the time for filing the complaint in an action which was commenced by service. Order
effective Jan. 1, 1973, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XIX,
XXII-XXVIII; 1 FIELD. McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 57-71 (Supp. 1981).
155. An initial amendment effective December 1, 1959. changed "may" to "shall"
in Rule 4(f) "to clear up any possible due process doubts" concerning the appropri-
ateness of service by mail outside the state in certain cases. See M.R. Civ. P. 4(f)
explanation of amendment to 1959 amend., 1 FIELD. McKusicK & Wnori, supra note
24, at 53.
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specify a form of service adequate to give notice consistent with due
process. 156
More recently, Rule 4(c) was amended in 1991 to make a major
change in the method by which process is served. Adopting a 1983
change in the Federal Rules, the Maine Rule was amended to pro-
vide that the summons and complaint may initially be served on
defendant by mailing copies, together with a form of acknowledg-
ment of receipt. A plaintiff attempting service under this option can
serve process by any other means provided in Rule 4(d) if the de-
fendant does not return the signed acknowledgment of receipt
within twenty days after the original mailing.1 57
In 1981, Rules 4(e) and (f) were amended to reflect changing atti-
tudes in the United States Supreme Court toward the degree of con-
nection between the state and the subject matter of a law suit neces-
sary to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction against a due
process challenge. Simultaneously with the original promulgation of
Rule 4(e) in 1959, Maine became one of the first states to enact a
"long-arm" statute. Such statutes enabled a state's courts to assert
jurisdiction over nonresidents for alleged conduct involving contact
with the state sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction consis-
156. See M. R. Civ. P. 4(j) and advisory committee note to 1966 amend., Me.
Rptr., 215-224 A.2d XXI, XXII and 1 FIELD & McKusICK, supra note 24, at 53; M. R.
Civ. P. 4(d), as amended by Order effective Dec. 31, 1967, and advisory committee
notes, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXVII, XXIX and 1 FIELD, McKUsIcK & WROTH,
supra note 24, at 53-55; Order effective Apr. 15, 1975, and advisory committee notes,
Me. Rptr., 326-335 A.2d XXII, XXXIII; Order effective Feb. 2, 1976, and advisory
committee notes, Me. Rptr., 344-351 A.2d XXVII, XXXI-XXXII; Order effective
Jan. 3, 1978, Me. Rptr., 381-384 A.2d XIX; Order effective Sept. 1, 1980, and advisory
committee notes, Me. Rptr., 413-417 A.2d LXVIII and 1 FIELD, McKUsIcK & WHOTH,
supra note 24, at 29 (Supp. 1981); Order effective Feb. 15, 1990, and advisory com-
mittee notes, Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d XXXI, LXII-LXIII. Rule 4 has also been
amended to deal with technical changes in the law or regulations. See Order effective
Nov. 1, 1969, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XIX-XX; 1
FIELD, McKuSICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 55-56; Order effective Feb. 2, 1976, and
advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 344-351 A.2d XXVII, XXXI-XXXII; Order ef-
fective Feb. 15, 1985, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 479-487 A.2d LIX,
LXIII.
157. See Order effective Feb. 15, 1991, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
583 A.2d No. 4 at CXX and CXXIX-CXXX (advance sheet). For the Federal Rule,
see, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). A simultaneous amendment to M.R. Civ. P. 4(h)
provided for the return of service. The amendment also narrowed the scope of Rule 4
to service of summons and complaint, rather than service of all process, necessitating
complementary amendments to Rules 4A, 4B, and 45 to make clear the means of
service of writs of attachment and trustee summons and subpoenas. See Order effec-
tive Feb. 15, 1991, and advisory committee notes, 583 A.2d No. 4 at CXXI and
CXXX (advance sheet). An earlier amendment to Rule 4(c) had eliminated the con-
stable as an officer empowered to serve process statewide, in view of the fact that
constables' powers run only within their towns or territories. See Order effective Feb.
15, 1987, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 510-521 A.2d LXXXI-LXXXII
and XC.
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tent with due process." 8 In succeeding years, the reach of the long-
arm was extended by a combination of aggressive state statutes and
permissive federal and state court decisions."" After a series of such
decisions by the Law Court, the Maine Legislature expanded
Maine's long-arm statute to include an extended list of specific situ-
ations and" a catch-all asserting jurisdiction in any case where due
process would permit.160 The Law Court, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice McKusick, gave the statute a reach exceeding that which the
United States Supreme Court has ultimately recognized for state
long-arm jurisdiction.1 61 Nevertheless, the Maine statute remains a
far-reaching jurisdictional grant. The amendment of Rule 4(e)
sought to reflect this increased statutory scope.102
The 1981 amendment of Rule 4(f) and simultaneous amendments
of Rules 4A and 4B reflected a decision of the United States Su-
preme Court that sought to apply the "minimum contacts" jurispru-
dence of the long-arm cases evenhandedly. It had long been the
practice of state courts, supported by the 1920 United States Su-
preme Court decision in Harris v. Balk,0 3 to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants on the basis of property found and attached
within the state, regardless of the contact of the defendant or the
subject matter of the law suit with the state. Rule 4(f) and Rules 4A
and 4B as originally promulgated were designed to provide the me-
dium for the Maine courts to exercise this power of "foreign
attachment."'*
In Shaffer v. Heitner1 65 decided in 1980, the Supreme Court held
that sauce for the goose should moisten the gander as welh unless
the defendant had some contact with the state independent of prop-
158. See M.R. Civ. P. 4 reporter's notes, Dec. 1, 1959, 1 FwELD. McKustcK &
WROTH, supra note 24, 50, 51-52; Memorandum of Richard H. Field, 2 id. at 566;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); ILL STAT. ANM oh. 110, 1
2-209 (formerly § 17 of the Civil Practice Act); and 1 FomLD. McKusicK & WaOm,
supra note 24, § 4.10.
159. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 l1L2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); R.L GEM Lows, § 9-5-
33 (Supp. 1985); Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.03, 13
ULA. 355, 361-62; and 1 FIELD. McKusICK & WRoTH, supra note 24, § 4.10.
160. See P.L. 1975, ch. 770, § 80, enacting ME. REv. STAT. ANN tit. 14 § 704-A;
Sohn v. Bernstein, 279 A.2d 529 (Me. 1971); 1 FIELD. McKusicK & WRom, supra
note 24, § 4.10 (Supp. 1981).
161. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); and Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1 (Me. 1980).
162. See M.R. Civ. P. 4(e) advisory committee's note to 1981 amend. See also
Order effective Aug. 7, 1981, and advisory committee's notes, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d
XXXV and XLVII.
163. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
164. See M.R. Civ. P. 4(f), 4A, 4B reporter's notes, I FmLD. McKusicK & WROTH,
supra note 24, at 52, 118-19, 131-32.
165. 433 U.S. 186 (1980).
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erty ownership, or the lawsuit involved the property in question, due
process prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction merely on the basis of
property found within the state. The amendment of Rule 4(f) ad-
dressed this problem by limiting service by mail to cases where there
were either independent contacts, or the property or status provid-
ing the basis for jurisdiction was involved in the controversy. 0 0
Rules 4A, 4B, and 4C. As originally adopted, Rules 4A, 4B, and
4C incorporated the existing, complex, and antiquated statutory
provisions authorizing general attachment, attachment on trustee
process, and civil arrest, integrating them with the provisions of
Rules 3 and 4 concerning the commencement of the action and ser-
vice of the summons and complaint. 6 7 The first changes came in the
rules governing trustee process. State and federal consumer protec-
tion legislation prohibiting attachment or garnishment of wages
before judgment was reflected in 1967, 1970, and 1971 amendments
of Rule 4B.16  Thus the Maine rule was not affected by a 1969
United States Supreme Court decision that wage garnishment with-
out some opportunity on the part of the defendant to be heard vio-
lated due process.'
Two years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 70 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the reach of this principle in terms which seemed to indicate
that all forms of attachment were affected. Subsequently, Rules 4A
and 4B were amended in two stages in January and August 1973 to
permit issuance of an order of approval for either general attach-
ment or trustee process only on a finding that there was reasonable
likelihood that the plaintiff would recover damages in an amount
exceeding any other available security. The order was to be issued
only after notice and hearing unless plaintiff also established the
likelihood that defendant would in some way impair the security if
notified of the pendency of the attachment. 1 '1
166. See M.R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory committee's note to 1981 amend., Me. Rptr.,
428-433 A.2d. XLIX; Order effective Aug. 7, 1981, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXV-
XXXVII. For a description of simultaneous amendments to Rules 4A and 4B, see
advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XLIX-L. More recently, the Su-
preme Court has held that Shaffer, supra note 165, does not preclude obtaining juris-
diction by personal service upon a nonresident having no contacts with the state.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110A S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
167. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
168. See Rule 4B(a) advisory committee's note to 1967, 1970 and 1971 amends., 1
FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 133; id. at 85-88 (Supp. 1981). See also
Order effective Dec. 31, 1967, Me. Rptr., 225-237 A.2d XXVII, XXIX-XXX; Order
effective July 1, 1970, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XXXIII-XXXIV; and Order effective
Sept. 23, 1971, Me. Rptr., 276-284 A.2d XIX.
169. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
170. 407 U.S. 67 (1971).
171. See M.R. Civ. P. 4A, 4B advisory committee's notes to Jan. and Aug. 1973
amends., 1 FIELD, McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 61-69, 88-90 (Supp. 1981).
The January amendments made the hearing applicable only to attachment of per-
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Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions have created some
doubt about the reach of Fuentes, the Maine Rules have continued
to require hearings, and amendments to Rules 4A and 4B in subse-
quent years have sought to clarify and strengthen the procedure. 7 2
These rules are presently under scrutiny by an ad hoc committee of
the bar from two perspectives: On the one hand, it is argued that
the present rules make attachment too difficult to obtain because of
the time and cost involved in the hearing procedure. On the other
hand, it is felt that the standard presently employed does not allow
the court sufficient flexibility in balancing hardships to the defend-
ant against the plaintiff's need. 7 3
The fate of Rule 4C, carrying forward the traditional common law
and statutory procedure of arrest on mesne process as a means of
commencing a law suit, has been less equivocal. In Yoder v. County
of Cumberland,17 4 the Law Court held that civil arrest, even to com-
pel a judgment debtor to disclose, was constitutionally permissible
only when the recalcitrant debtor was solvent. Subsequently, the
Legislature repealed the statutes which Rule 4C had incorporated.'"
In 1985, the court abrogated Rule 4C as having lost its function.'7 0
Presumably, the equitable writ of ne exeat is still available on a
proper showing to arrest a defendant in the extremely rare, if not
unthinkable, case in which the court has power to bring the defend-
ant bodily before it and no adequate alternative exists to prevent
sonal property, -giving Fuentes, supra note 170, a narrow interpretation. The August
amendments reflected decisions of a three-judge federal court in Gunter v. Merchants
Warren National Bank, 360 F.Supp. 1085 (D.Me. 1975), holding that the Fuentes
principle applied to real estate attachments as well. 1 FIELD. McKusIcK & WaomI,
supra, § 4A.1 (Supp. 1981).
172. See Order effective Apr. 15, 1975, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr.,
326-335 A.2d XXII-XXV, XXXIH-XXXV; Order effective Sept. 1, 1980, and advi-
sory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 413-417 A.2d LXVII-LXIX; Order effective Aug. 7,
1981, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XXXVII-XL, XLIX-L;
and Order effective Feb. 15, 1991, and advisory committee notes, Me. Rptr., 583(4)
A.2d CXXI-CXXII, CXXX. The constitutional issues were revisited by the United
States Supreme Court this term in Connecticut v. Doehr, 59 U.S.L.W. 45-87 (June 6,
1991) (No. 90-143), which found a due process violation in an ex parte order for at-
tachment of real estate under a Connecticut statute requiring neither a finding of
exigent circumstances nor a plaintiff's bond. Similar amendments were made in Rule
64, applying Sniadach and Fuentes, supra notes 169 and 168, to replevin. See M.R.
Civ. P. 64 and advisory committee's note to 1973 amend., 2 FELD, McKusicK, &
WRoTH, supra note 24, at 381-84 (Supp. 1981). Other amendments to Rules 4A and
4B have been discussed in conjunction with amendments to Rule 4, supro notes 163-
66, and accompanying text.
173. See ADviSORY CommrrrEE ON Civu, RULES. 1990 ANNUAL REeoaT 5; Minutes
of Meeting, Sept. 14, 1990, id. at 2; AD Hoc CoLMrrrEE ON ATTACHuETs, REPORT TO
THE ADvIsORY CobBUrrra ON Civn. RULES (July 19, 1991).
174. 278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971).
175. P.L. 1971, ch. 408, § 6.
176. See M.R. Civ. P. 4C advisory committee's note to 1985 abrogation, Me. Rptr.,
479-487 A.2d LIX, LXII.
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frustration of the court's authority and jurisdiction. 177
2. Pretrial Practice and the Law's Delays
A major area of continuing frustration, development, and change
in both the Maine and the Federal Rules has been pretrial practice.
The provisions for extensive discovery, pretrial conference, schedul-
ing, and motions contained in Rules 7, 16, 26-37, 40, and 56 were
hailed as potentially the most beneficial innovations in the Federal
Rules. These provisions were also cited as one of the major benefits
in Maine's 1959 adoption of the Rules.178 In more recent years, how-
ever, the delays and expense of pretrial practice have become the
focus of extensive criticism, and numerous amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules have been adopted or proposed to deal with the problems.
In Maine, the same criticisms have been heard, and some of the
same solutions have been adopted. In Maine, however, the discus-
sion and the attempted solutions have been intertwined with efforts
to alter the motion, pretrial conference, and scheduling practice and
to adopt more radical approaches as well. Through the whole discus-
sion runs the continuing tension between those who see reform as
simply a question of leveling the playing field between plaintiff and
defendant and those concerned with the most economical and effi-
cient use of the human, fiscal, and physical resources of the Judicial
Department. The extensive amendments to this group of rules illus-
trate the growing perception of the need to balance these concerns
and the variety of methods available to assist in striking that
balance.
a. Motion Practice. Rule 7 as originally promulgated simply
stated that a motion to obtain a court order on any matter should be
in writing and state "with particularity" both the grounds of the
motion and the order sought.179 The rule applied alike to dispositive
motions, such as those under Rules 12 and 56, and housekeeping
motions, such as those to resist or compel discovery. Motion prac-
tice, however, began to present problems after the 1970 discovery
amendments removed the trial court from initial review and super-
vision of most discovery. Compounding this were the combined ef-
fects of increased litigation and new word-processing technology. An
amendment of Rule 7(b) in 1976 required the moving party to cite
the rule or statute on which a motion was based, and a 1981 amend-
ment required a supporting memorandum of authorities to be filed
with all but calendar or uncontested motions, with a memorandum
177. See 1 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, § 4C.4 (Supp. 1981). But
see M.R. Civ. P. 4C advisory committee's note, supra note 176.
178. See 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26-60
(2d ed. 1985); Field, State-Wide Procedural Reform-How to Go About It, 42 J. AM.
JUD. SOC'Y 120, 124 (1958); Field, supra note 24, at 40-41.
179. M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (1959).
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in opposition to be filed within ten days.180 In 1983, teeth were
added to these provisions when Rule 11 was amended to include mo-
tions within the scope of its sanctions for groundless or dilatory
filings.181
From 1986 through 1990, the motion provisions of Rule 7 have
been amended annually, with the purpose both to limit motions that
must be heard to those with a genuine issue and to accommodate
the rule to changing practices in the clerks' offices. Thus a 1986
amendment changed the time for filing a memorandum in opposi-
tion from ten days after service of the movant's memorandum to
seven days prior to the hearing. 82 In 1987, the rule was further
amended to provide that failure to file a memorandum in opposition
was a waiver of objections that would result in the granting of the
motion without hearing. 83 A 1988 amendment, clarified in 1989,
sought to ease the burdens on both judges and clerks by requiring
the movant to file a draft order stating the relief to be granted and,
except in the case of dispositive or ex parte motions, a statement
indicating whether or not the motion was opposed.18'
Finally, in 1990, major amendments to Rules 6, 7, and 56 sought
to end confusion about filing times for both memoranda in opposi-
tion and supporting affidavits by returning to a requirement that
these items must be filed within 21 days after filing of the motion.
The amendments also limited the requirement of a statement of op-
position or nonopposition to calendar motions, required the parties
to summary judgment motions to file summaries of their factual
contentions with their memoranda, and permitted a brief reply
memorandum to be filed within seven days after filing of a memo-
randum in opposition or two days before hearing.1 8
The history of these amendments reflects that motion practice has
virtually become an end in itself. The court has sought to reduce the
burden by imposing increasingly onerous requirements on those who
would present a motion for hearing. Nevertheless, with word-
processing at the lawyers' command, the flow of motions continues.
180. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) and advisory committee's note to 1976 amend., 1
FmL, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 102-03 (Supp. 1981); M.R. Civ. P.
7(b)(3) added effective Dec. 1, 1981, Me. Rptr., 434-440 Ak2d XLI.
181. See M.R. Civ. P. 11 and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me.
Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LIII, LXI.
182. See M.P. Civ. P. 7(b)(3) and advisory committee's note to 1986 amend., Me.
Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XLII, XLVIII.
183. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3) and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me.
Rptr., 510-521 A.2d LXXXII, XC.
184. See M. Civ. P. 7(b)(3), (4), and advisory committee's note to 1988 amend.,
Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXI-CCXI, CCXXVI; M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(4) and advisory
committee's note to 1989 amend., Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XXXI, XXXV.
185. See M.R. Civ. P. 6(d), 7(b)-(e), 56(c), and advisory committee's note to 1990
amends., Me. Rptr., 563-575 A.2d LXIX-LXXI, LXXII-LXXI. See Alexander, AMo-
tion Day: Old Traditions, New Rules: Guide to Survival, 5 Ma. BAR J. 166 (1990).
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Consequently, any efforts to reduce the cost and delay of this aspect
of practice must look to ways of reducing the occasions on which
motions are brought.
b. Discovery-Rules 26-37. A major study of federal discovery in
1967 concluded that the system was working well and was not sub-
ject to abuse, but that changes to smooth the flow of the process and
reduce the need for judicial intervention would be desirable. As a
result, substantial amendments to the federal discovery rules were
adopted in 1970 to achieve these goals.186 In the ensuing decade,
however, dissatisfaction with the operation of the discovery rules
grew in both the federal and state courts. Delay, expense, and op-
pressive use were all cited as abuses. Accordingly, in 1980 and 1983,
further federal amendments were adopted to address these problems
and strengthen the hand of trial judges seeking to curb abuse.187 In
1991, the problems remain unresolved. Proposals ranging from
stricter sanctions to mandatory open-file discovery have been made,
and a significant proposal to amend the federal discovery rules by
replacing continuing judicial oversight with strict mechanical re-
quirements is pending before the federal Advisory Committee.8 8
The Maine experience with discovery has tracked that of the fed-
eral courts. The 1970 federal amendments were adopted virtually
without change, relying heavily on the federal Advisory Committee's
Notes."'9 The principal changes wrought by the 1970 amendments of
Maine Rules 26-37 were as follows:
Federal Rule 26 covering general matters such as scope of discov-
ery and protective orders was adopted, including provisions permit-
ting discovery of insurance policies and experts. Rule 26(b)(3), new
to the federal rule, carried forward the sense of prior Maine Rule
186. For the federal rule changes and the study on which they were based, see
Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D 487 (Oct. 1970)
(Appendix 2). The ABA Special Committee chaired by McKusick made an extensive
report on the proposed amendments. See supra note 4.
187. For the few federal changes between 1970 and 1980 see Order of March 1,
1971, effective July 1, 1971, 401 U.S. 1019; Order of Nov. 20, 1972, effective July 1,
1975, 419 U.S. 1133-1135. The 1980 and 1983 amendments allowed judges to impose
limits on unduly burdensome discovery, required counsel to frame a discovery plan,
and imposed an obligation for discovery like that of Rule 11, with sanctions for viola.
tion. For advisory committee notes on the 1980 and 1983 amendments to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26, 30, 33, 34, & 37, see FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 101-103,
112, 118, 120, & 131 (West ed. 1991). For a sampling of critical commentary, see
supra note 102.
188. See proposed amendments to F.R. Civ. P. 26, 29, 30-34, 36, 37, in COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TIE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (August 1991).
189. See Order of July 1, 1970, Me. Rptr., 257-266 A.2d XXXV (1970), adopting
amendments effective Oct. 1, 1970.
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26(b) concerning discovery of trial preparation materials.10 The
scope of discovery was also broadened by eliminating the require-
ment of a showing of good cause for production under Rule 34; al-
lowing interrogatories under Rule 33 against "any" party, not
merely an "adverse" party; providing that Rule 33 interrogatories
and requests for admission under Rule 36 could extend to matters of
opinion and argument; and making physical examination under Rule
35 available for a person under the custody or control of a party.'0 '
A number of changes were made in the interests of minimizing
court intervention in the discovery process including elimination of
the requirement in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for a court order to obtain
certain discovery and placing on the party seeking discovery the
burden of obtaining an order to compel in the event of an objection.
The sanctions provisions of Rule 37 were strengthened and clarified
in aid of these changes.. 2
Certain unique features of the existing Maine rules were retained
and other departures from the 1970 federal amendments were
adopted. Thus Maine Rule 29 does not contain the federal require-
ment that extension of the time for response under Rules 33, 34, and
36 be by court order. The Maine requirement of seven days' notice
of a deposition under Rule 30(b)(1) (now ten days by virtue of a
1987 amendment) was retained in preference to the federal require-
ment of "reasonable" notice. Further, in Maine Rule 33, the limit to
service of one set of thirty interrogatories was retained.1 0 3
190. See M.R. Civ. P. 26 and advisory committee's note to 1970 amend., 1 FIELD.
McKusiCK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 205-207 (Supp. 1981). The rule also included
new provisions governing sequence and timing and requiring supplementation of re-
sponses that reflected Maine practice. M. R. Civ. P. 26(d), (e); 1 FILDw. McKusicm &
WnoTH, supra note 24, at 197-205 (Supp. 1981).
191. See M.R. Civ. P. 33(a),(b), 34, 35(a), 36(a), and advisory committee's notes to
1970 amends., 1 FIELD. McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 249, 255, 259, and 262
(1981). At the same time, Rule 45(d) was amended to make clear that a deposition
subpoena duces tecum could require inspection and copying of documents. M.R. Civ.
P. 45(d)(1) and advisory committee's notes to 1970 amend., id. at 296.297. Rule 35(b)
had earlier been amended to reflect creation of the physician-patient privilege in
Maine by statute. See M.R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2) and advisory committee's note to 1969
amend., id. at 524-26 (2d ed. 1970).
192. See M.R. Civ. P. 33(a), 34(b), 36(a), 37, and advisory committee's notes to
1970 amends., 1 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 249, 255, 263, and 268-
69 (Supp. 1981). Other changes included allowing modification of the procedure of
the rules, by written stipulation and reduction of the requirement of a court order for
early depositions. See M.R. Civ. P. 29, 30(a), id. at 223, 231. The requirement of a
court order for interrogatories within 20 days of commencement of the action had
been taken from the then-pending federal amendment proposals in 1967. See M.R.
Civ. P. 33 and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., id. at 503-05.
193. See M.R. Civ. P. 29, 30(b)(1), 33(a), and advisory committee's notes to 1970
amends., 1 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 223, 231, and 249 (Supp.
1981); M.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me.
Rptr., 510-521 A.2d LXXXII, XCL
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In the fifteen years after the adoption of the 1970 amendments to
Maine Rules 26-37, only a few relatively technical amendments were
made. In fact, the most significant change may have been the elimi-
nation of the limit on the number of interrogatories, because it had
resulted in increased motions "disputing the actual number of inter-
rogatories involved."'
1 94
Responding to concerns about discovery abuse similar to those ex-
pressed under the Federal Rules, the Maine Advisory Committee
has, since 1983, engaged in a continuing study of the problems sur-
rounding discovery, and the federal attempts to improve the situa-
tion.1"5 The Advisory Committee and the court, however, have not
followed the path of the Federal Rules in increasing judicial over-
sight and sanctioning power in the discovery process. Only a few of
the federal reforms of the 1980's and other changes designed to
make discovery more efficient have been adopted. 99
194. See M.R. Civ. P. 33(a) and advisory committee's note to 1981 amend., Me.
Rptr., 428-433 A.2d XLIII, LII. A conforming amendment was subsequently made to
Rule 26(a). See Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LIV, LXII; Me. Rptr., 467-468 A.2d LXIV,
LXXIII. For other discovery amendments made in this period, see M.R. Civ. P. 27
and advisory committee's note to 1971 amend., 1 FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTH, supra
note 24, at 221; M.R. Civ. P. 28(d) and advisory committee's note to 1975 abrogation,
id. at 222; M.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), (h), (c), and advisory committee's notes to 1971,
1975, and 1976 amends., id. at 233-37; M.R. Civ. 31(d) and advisory committee's note
to 1975 amend., id. at 241; M.R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) and advisory committee's note to
1984 amend., Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXIV, LXXIII; M.R. Civ. P. 32(c) and advi-
sory committee's note to 1976 abrogation, 1 FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note
24, at 246; M.R. Civ. P. 33(a) and advisory committee's note to 1971 amend., id. at
250; M.R. Civ. P. 36(a) and advisory committee's note to 1971 amend., id. at 263.
195. See Alexander, Some Thoughts on Improving Discovery and the Practice of
Law, 4 ME. BAR J. 128 (1989); Lipez, How a Judge Can Survive Discovery, id. at 150.
ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 5-6; 1984
ANNUAL REPoRT 4; 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 4; 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 3, 4; 1987 ANNUAL
REPORT 6; 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 5; 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 4; 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
196. See, e.g., amendments eliminating filing of discovery materials not to be used
in evidence. M.R. Civ. P. 5(d), 26(f), 30(f) and advisory committee's notes to 1985
amends., Me. Rptr., 479-487 A.2d LIX-LXI, LXIII-LXIV. See also M.R. Civ. P. 30(e)
and advisory committee's note to amend. effective Feb. 15, 1987, Me. Rptr., 510-521
A.2d LXXXIV, XCIII. For provisions for nonstenographic recording of depositions,
see M.R. Civ. P. 30(b), (c), (f), and advisory committee's notes to 1987 amends., Me.
Rptr., 510-521 A.2d LXXXII-LXXXV, XCI-XCIII. Federal Rule 30(b)(4) provides
that the parties may stipulate, or the court may order on motion, recording by non-
stenographic means. For advisory committee notes on the 1970 amendment to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 30(b)(4), see FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 110 (West 1991). For provi-
sions for deposition by telephone, see M.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7) and advisory committee's
note to 1989 amendment, Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XXXII, XXXV. For an amend-
ment requiring documents to be produced either in their usual order or in requested
categories, see M.R. Civ. P. 34(b) and advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment,
583 A.2d No. 4, at CXXIII-CXXIV, CXXX-CXXXI. For advisory committee notes
on the 1980 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b), see FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROcE-
DURE AND RULES 120 (West 1991). A similar provision added at the same time to F.R.
Civ. P. 33(c) covering the option to produce business records in answer to an interro-
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Maine's failure to follow the federal lead to this point has been
based in part on the belief that discovery abuse problems in the
Maine courts are not so acute and in part on the reliance, discussed
below, upon other means of addressing problems of expense and de-
lay in the pretrial process. Nevertheless, consideration of the
problems of discovery continues. A subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee is presently considering options ranging from adoption
of the 1980 and 1983 federal amendments that would increase judi-
cial oversight to adoption of portions of the August 1991 federal
amendment proposals, such as required disclosures or standard in-
terrogatories and strict quantitative limits on discovery methods.'
Changes in pretrial procedural rules are like the never-ending con-
test that goes on between nations in the field of armaments: For
every new offensive weapon or stratagem devised, a counter soon ap-
pears. The federal discovery amendments of the 1980's have demon-
strated this axiom by producing a whole subset of litigation about
the imposition and enforcement of discovery sanctions.1'0 The ques-
tion, alike for the federal rulemakers and Maine's Advisory Commit-
tee and court, is whether the new trend toward imposition of re-
quired disclosure and strict quantitative limits will be any more
effective in reducing abuse, or whether the answer lies in addressing
the larger context of trial preparation and scheduling and pretrial
disposition in which discovery must operate.
c. The Pretrial Conference. As originally promulgated, Rule 16
followed the federal model in providing in simple terms for a discre-
tionary pretrial conference. The purpose of the conference was to
consider simplification of the issues, amendments to the pleadings,
the possibility of admissions, limitations on the number of experts,
and "[s]uch other matters as may aid in the disposition of the ac-
tion."119 The resulting pretrial order was to control the course of the
trial unless modified "to prevent manifest injustice." The court had
discretion to establish a pretrial calendar.20 0
Federal Rule 16 remained in this form, though supplemented by
local rules, until it was substantially amended in 1983 as part of the
discovery amendments of that year.201 The federal rule now provides
gatory was not adopted in Maine. For advisory committee notes on the 1980 amend-
ment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(c), see FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 118
(West 1991).
197. See ADVISORY Cos?,rrEE ON CIVIL RULES. REPORT OF THE DiscoVERv SUB-
coMrrrEa (JULY 19. 1991). FOR THE 1991 FEDERAL PROPOSALS, see supra note 188.
198. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 982-992 (1987); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L Rav. 485-486 (1988-89); Margaret L. Weissbrod,
Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 OIO ST. LJ. 183 (1985).
199. M.R. Civ. P. 16(5) (1959).
200. Id.
201. Regarding the 1983 amendments, see supra note 187. Regarding local rules,
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for a discretionary pretrial conference with general objectives fo-
cused on case management and settlement, as well as an expanded
list of specific matters for consideration at the conference: the avoid-
ance of unnecessary proof, scheduling, the possibility of reference,
settlement, or alternative dispute resolution, and the disposition of
pending motions. In addition, after a scheduling conference or less
formal contact with the parties, the court is to issue a scheduling
order with amendment, motion, and discovery deadlines. Substan-
tial sanctions, including those provided by Rule 37, may be imposed
for noncompliance with an order, nonappearance, or lack of prepara-
tion or good faith. 0 2
In Maine, the evolution of Rule 16 toward a similar posture began
in 1962 with an amendment providing the sanction of dismissal or
default for nonappearance at a pretrial conference.20 3 In 1967, an
elaborate new Rule 16 was promulgated in reaction to the fact that
Maine's trial judges had made the conference virtually mandatory,
with resulting stress on the pretrial calendar and loss of effective-
ness for individual conferences.2 0 Under the amended rule, in order
to move an action to the trial calendar, one of the parties had to file
a pretrial memorandum covering issues, proposed admissions, evi-
dentiary matters, damages, and other matters and containing a jury
demand if appropriate. This memorandum and a reply by the op-
posing party were to be filed in every case except collection actions,
property damage suits, condemnation suits, nonjury matters, and
cases where a pretrial conference had been waived. The court could
treat the memoranda as a pretrial order and direct the case to be
placed on the trial calendar or could order a conference to be held,
provided that all discovery had been completed. Counsel were re-
quired to attend, with authority to settle, and sanctions could in-
clude attorneys' fees and travel.2 °0 By simultaneous amendment, the
original local option approach of Rule 40 for the maintenance of the
trial calendar was changed to a uniform procedure incorporating
Rule 16.208
see, e.g., U.S.D.C., D. Me. R. 21 (1981) in 2 FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTII, supra note
24, at 1082-84 (Supp. 1981).
202. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend. FEDERAL
CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 61-64 (West 1991).
203. M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1962 amend., 1 FIELD,
McKUSICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 313.
204. See M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., 1 FIELD,
McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 310-12, 314-17. The problems under the prior
rule are outlined in Wroth, supra note 47, at 57-72 (1968).
205. M.R. Civ. P. 16, supra note 204. A subsequent amendment permitted a con-
ference in any case on request of a party and provided for sanctions on the attorney
as well as the party. See M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1970
amend., 1 FIELD, McKuSICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 134, 138 (Supp. 1981).
206. See M.R. Civ. P. 40(a) and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., 1
FIELD, McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 562, 563.
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The 1967 amendment established the principle that a detailed
pretrial memorandum was the mandatory predicate to a pretrial
conference, as well as the sole avenue to the trial calendar, but the
details of practice remained a moving target. Citing various short-
comings in the rule, the Advisory Committee proposed and the court
adopted substantial amendments in 1973, eliminating the require-
ment for completion of discovery as well as the whole system of ex-
cepted actions. Thus a conference was to be held in every case un-
less the judge found that the memoranda were sufficient for the
conduct of the trial.20 7
A further major revision, adopted in 1980, was "intended to rem-
edy substantial defects in the existing scheme of pretrial procedure
and to give more explicit, rigorous and detailed directions for pre-
trial procedure for the benefit of both the Bench and the Bar. 120
The 1980 version of the rule also retained the basic requirement of
the memorandum, with a conference to be held unless the judge spe-
cifically dispensed with it. The amended rule, however, spelled out
in greater detail the contents of the memorandum and the subjects
to be considered at the conference. The rule also made clear the
mandatory nature of its provisions by emphasizing sanctions for
noncompliance. Further, it expressly required the status of motions,
discovery, and settlement to be reported in the memorandum and
discussed at the conference.200 In implementation of the new rule,
the court issued an administrative order basically saying "we really
mean it" and setting forth detailed guidelines for clerks and court
administrators and a form of pretrial order.210 This version of the
rule was to endure with minor amendments until 1988. While some
of the rhetoric of the 1980 Advisory Committee's note speaks of effi-
cient utilzation of judicial resources, it is plain that the principal
focus of Rule 16 remained on the use of the pretrial memorandum
and conference as instruments to assure proper trial preparation
and encourage settlement within the confines of the particular
litigation.211
207. See M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1973 amend., id. at
135-37, 138-41. Conforming amendments were also made to M.R. Civ. P. 40(a). Id. at
282-83. Rule 16 was further amended in 1974 to clarify its relationship to a concur-
rent amendment of Rule 38 requiring that a jury be demanded and in 1976 to accom-
modate the hearsay exception for learned treatises in M.R. Evid. 803(18), adopted
concurrently. Id. at 135, 136, 141.
208. M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1980 amend., id. at 142.
209. See M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1980 amend., id. at
129-34, 141-50.
210. Order of July 14, 1980, id. at 14243, 150-51.
211. Id. at 142-43, 150-51. Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to except divorce actions
in which a conference had not been requested from the requirement of a conference.
M.R.Civ. P. 16(f)(1) and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me. Rptr., 449-
458 A.2d LIV, LXII. In conjunction with the merger of the superior court and district
court civil rules, effective July 1, 1987, Rule 16 was amended to make clear that it
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d. Case Management. The Advisory Committee, however, was at
work on broader concerns. In 1984, the court, on the Committee's
recommendation, adopted an administrative order establishing an
experimental civil case-flow management procedure to be imple-
mented in four counties. The experiment was designed
to address two problems. . . existing in the Maine Superior Court.
First, the dramatic rise in filings of civil cases resulted in uncon-
scionably long docket delays; and second, the greatly increased use
of discovery in civil cases which is both a cause of the delays in
civil litigation and a source of unnecessary expense.212
Derived from a system employed in the District of Columbia, the
experiment involved the creation of a two-track calendar system. At
the outset of each action a superior court justice was assigned to
review a pretrial scheduling statement submitted by the plaintiff af-
ter consultation with the defendant. Any cases that the reviewing
justice determined not to be complex would be placed on an expe-
dited pretrial list with fixed discovery deadlines and no pretrial
memoranda or conference. Cases on that list would go on the trial
list 30 days after the date set for completion of discovery and would
be tried as soon'as they could be reached. Cases not deemed appro-
priate for expedited treatment would be placed on the regular trial
list and proceeded with as usual under Rule 16 and the discovery
rules.213 Impressed with the effectiveness of the experiment, the
court by further administrative order extended the procedure to all
counties effective February 1, 1986. The only changes were the in-
clusion of specific provisions that the order placing a case on the
regular pretrial list could establish discovery and other deadlines
and that in an expedited case motions pertaining to trial could be
filed after completion of discovery.214 The case-management focus of
this procedure plainly appears in the memorandum transmitting the
administrative order to the clerks of court and the bar:
The goal of the procedure is the establishment of a system under
which a larger portion of the civil actions filed in the Superior
Court may be resolved finally within a reasonably short period of
applied only in the superior court, and a new Rule 16A was added, providing a discre-
tionary pretrial conference procedure for the district court similar to M.R. Civ. P. 16
prior to the 1967 amendments, supra notes 204-205. See M.R. Civ. P. 16, 16A, and
,1987 advisory committee's notes to amends., Me. Rptr., 522-536 A.2d LXXII-
LXXVIII.
212. Advisory Committee's Explanatory Memorandum Concerning Administra-
tive Order in Regard to Civil Case Flow Expedition, 18 ME. BAR BULL. 267 (1984).
213. See Order of Sept. 26, 1984, effective Nov. 1, 1984, No. SJC-316; Advisory
Committee's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 211, at 267-72. The original or-
der was amended by Order of June 3, 1985, effective June 3, 1985, No. SJC-316, to
make provision for third-party actions.
214. See Order of Jan. 2, 1986, effective Feb. 1, 1986, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d
CXIX-CXXI.
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time, hopefully within one (1) year, and the elimination of unnec-
essary delay in the processing of all civil actions218
Noting that "[i]t is apparent that the fast track procedure has
well served its intended purposes... to reduce the backlog of the
civil docket and to expedite the conduct of all civil litigation," the
Advisory Committee recommended the incorporation of the provi-
sions of the 1986 administrative order in Rule 16. The recommenda-
tion as adopted by the court effective February 15, 1988, carried for-
ward the terms of the order with the change that the conference of
counsel in an expedited action was mandatory and with other minor
changes necessary to blend the procedure into the Rules.2 ' With
most superior court justices enthusiastically directing cases to the
expedited track, the new Rule 16 has effectively (some trial lawyers
would say too effectively) reduced the time devoted to the pretrial
process in many cases. The problem is that with no increase in the
number of judges and courtrooms, these cases now sit for long peri-
ods on ever-lengthening trial calendars.
e. Single Justice Management. All reforms of Maine's pretrial
procedural rules come up against an obstacle beyond their scope:
Under the traditional judicial assignment system, superior court jus-
tices ride circuit through the 16 counties according to a master rota-
tion list prepared by the Administrative Office of the Courts under
the 9upervision of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court. " The
effect of this system is that the circuit-riding justices take the
docket as they find it on arrival in a given county and deal with
whatever matters are then pending in actions filed in that county.
Frequently, several judges will be involved at various points in a sin-
gle lawsuit as it works its way through different procedural stages.
For a number of years, critics both of the trial process and of
court efficiency have called for a change to a system of single justice
management, in which assignments would be of cases rather than
courts.21 The justice first assigned by some random method to a
215. Memorandum from Superior Court Chief Justice Clifford to clerks of court,
members of the bar, January 22, 1986 (emphasis in original).
216. See M.R. Civ. P. 16 and advisory committee's note to 1988 amend., Me.
Rptr., 522-536 A.2d CCXIII-CCXX, CXXVII-CCXXVIII. Amended Rule 16(d) now
contemplates that the plaintiff will ordinarily be directed to file the initial pretrial
memorandum in an action on the regular trial list. Id. Conforming amendments were
made simultaneously to the jury demand provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 38. Id. at CCX-
XU-CCXXIII, CCXXIX. Rule 16(c)(2) was further amended effective Feb. 15, 1989,
to give the court discretion to hear pretrial motions such as those for summary judg-
ment even though filed after completion of discovery. Me. Rptr., 551-562 A.2d XX-
XII, XXXV. In a further conforming change in 1989, Rule 41(a)(1) vas amended to
provide that voluntary dismissal is permitted only until the time for answer or mo-
tion for summary judgment, rather than until trial. See supra notes 86. 116.
217. See MF. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 101, 105, 110; Silsby, History of the Maine
Superior Court 14 M-. BAR BULL 149, 175-79 (1980) (Pt. II).
218. See ADVISORY CONMMrrrE ON RuLrs OF CML PROCEDUR. 1989 ANNUAL RE-
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particular case would thereafter be responsible for all subsequent
actions concerning that case, including pretrial scheduling and the
pretrial conference, decisions on discovery and other motions, and
the conduct of the trial. This system would benefit both the trial of
the individual action and court management. A single judge thor-
oughly familiar with the case could take and maintain active control
over its management from the beginning, could keep counsel focused
on moving the case along, and could render consistent decisions on
all aspects of the case. These benefits in turn would permit cases to
move more rapidly and efficiently toward settlement or trial and
would provide a built-in check on discovery abuse and other delay-
ing or cost-engendering tactics.
There are, however, numerous difficulties in implementing this
system in Maine. With only sixteen superior court justices for the
same number of counties, caseloads of individual judges are very
high, and the practical problem of assuring appropriate geographical
distribution of judge time is great. In addition, the Maine bench and
bar have long recognized the positive aspects of the circuit-riding
system: lawyers and litigants have access to a wider and more fre-
quently available selection of judges than would be the case if a sin-
gle justice were assigned to each county. Since 1989, the Advisory
Committee has had the possibility of single justice management for
the superior court under consideration. Mindful of the practical con-
cerns and the positive aspects of circuit-riding, the Committee hopes
to develop, in conjunction with the superior court justices and
clerks, a system under which judges would still travel but individual
assignments would be made. The first step may be an experimental
application of this system in Cumberland County, where the largest
number of judges presently sits and where new courtrooms are now
available. 219
f. Alternative Dispute Resolution. In the view of many, more rad-
ical solutions to the problems of cost and delay in the courts must
be sought. In Maine, significant steps have been taken toward such
solutions. In 1980, after three years of privately funded experimen-
tation with the use of mediation in small claims and divorce litiga-
tion, the Maine Court Mediation Service was established within the
Judicial Department by court order.220 In 1984, the Legislature
PORT 4; SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 3 (Nov. 1989); 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 5; NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGE-
MENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 73 (1988); ABA DIVISION FOR
JUDICIAL SERVICES, DEFEATING DELAY: DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COURT DELAY
REDUCTION PROGRAM 42 (1986).
219. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1990 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 5; Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 29, 1990; Feb. 14, 1991.
220. See Greason, Humanists as Mediators: An Experiment in the Courts of
Maine, 66 A.B.A.J. 576 (1980); Johns & Clark, The Maine Court Mediation Service,
15 ME. BAR BULL. 73 (1981). See also Mediation Services Extended in Maine Courts,
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made mediation mandatory in all contested domestic relations cases
involving minor children, and in the following year the Court Media-
tion Service was formally established by statute.2 2 The Service,
managed by employees of the Judicial Department, employs a roster
of seventy-five trained mediators available on call, and has access to
facilities in courthouses and elsewhere for the conduct of media-
tions. By statute, the chief justice is to appoint and chair in person,
or through a designee, the Court Mediation Committee that sets
policy for and monitors the Service.222
In 1986, the Legislature established a new system of mandatory
prelitigation screening and mediation panels for use in medical mal-
practice actions. The panels are drawn from a list prepared and
maintained under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Superior
Court, who is also responsible for appointing the chair of each panel
formed to deal with a specific claim. Unless the parties agree to by-
pass the process, the panel conducts a factual hearing and makes
findings on the issues of negligence and causation that may be the
basis for settlement or may under certain conditions be admissible
in a subsequent trial.223
The court has been directly involved in another alternative dis-
pute resolution development. In 1986, a special Commission on Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution constituted by the Maine State Bar
Association proposed an experiment with the use of court-annexed
mediation in civil actions in the superior court. The experimental
program involved the selection of "mediatable" cases by the justice
reviewing the pretrial scheduling statements and the assignment of
those cases (as well as those in which mediation was requested) to
one of a panel of experienced trial lawyers who had agreed to serve
as mediators. The mediator was given wide latitude in the methods
to be used to develop the case and bring the parties together. The
mediator's decision was intended to be the basis of settlement, but
was to be nonbinding.22'
With the support of the court, the Bar Commission's proposal was
presented to the legislatively established Commission to Examine
Problems of Tort Litigation and Liability Insurance in Maine. That
Commission recommended that funds be provided to the Judicial
14 id. at 37 (1981). Clark & Orbeton, Mandatory Mediation of Dirorce: Maine's Ex-
perience, 69 JUDICATURE 310 (1986).
221. See P.L. 1983, ch. 813, §§ 2-5, enacting Ma. REv. STAT ANN tit. 19, §§ 581,
636, 665, 752; P.L. 1985, ch. 396, § 1, enacting Ma. Ray. STAT, ANN. tit. 4, § 18.
222. Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18(5).
223. See P.L. 1986, ch. 804, § 12, enacting ME. REv. STAT. ANN tit. 24, §§ 2851-59.
224. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Proposal Prepared by the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Commission of the Maine State Bar Association, in MmlE STATE
LEGISLATURE. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO EXAMINE PROBLEMS OF TORT LmUATION
AND LIABILITY INSURANCE IN MAINE at Appendix J, 110-115 (1987).
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Council to conduct the experiment.2 25 The Legislature responded
with a small appropriation, and a Committee of the Council devel-
oped a revised version of the original Bar Association proposal.
Adopting that version, the court by administrative order set the ex-
periment in motion in York and Knox counties for two years begin-
ning September 1, 1988.228 Although evaluation of the experiment is
not yet complete, early indications are that the procedure served its
intended purpose of moving cases more quickly toward settlement.
Whether more cases that went to mediation ultimately were settled,
and whether the procedure was cost-effective, remain to be
determined.227
The jury is still out, so to speak, on the success of the steps that
have been taken to reduce litigation delays and expense in Maine.
All of the steps require the continuing willingness of judges, lawyers,
and litigants to use them effectively and in good faith. Moreover, it
is difficult to predict the potential for success of the proposals now
pending, because we lack empirical data and even the capacity to
obtain such data, on the day-to-day functioning of the civil litigation
process. In 1990, the Maine Legislature created the Commission to
Study the Future of the Courts. Perhaps the work of that body,
which is just getting under way, will provide both the data base and
the fresh and comprehensive look at today's problems necessary to
make substantial and systematic progress toward solving them.22 s
Whatever its direction, the Court Futures Commission will start
from the solid base already established in Maine.
3. Appellate Practice in the Law Court
In contrast to pretrial procedure, developments in appellate prac-
tice before the Law Court reflect a much more determined and suc-
cessful effort to achieve efficient and economical court operation.
The appeals rule (Rules 72-76A) as originally adopted in 1959,
were modeled on the framework of the Federal Rules. Although
many familiar features of Maine practice were woven into the fed-
eral model, the overall effect was a major change. Previously, review
by appeal had been available only in equity. In actions at law, re-
view in the Law Court was obtained by motion or the time-honored
bill of exceptions, which had to be filed during the term of court in
225. Id. at 82.
226. See P. & S.L. 1987, ch. 121 (effective Aug. 4, 1988); Order of July 29, 1988,
No. SJC-319, Me. Rptr., 537-550 A.2d XXXIX (effective Sept. 1, 1988).
227. See McEwen, Interim Report: Superior Court ADR Project (1990) (type-
script in present author's possession).
228. See P.L. 1989, ch. 891, part B. The Commission is expressly to consider alter-
native dispute resolution mechanisms, including increased use of reference under
Rule 53 and expansion of mediation under the Court Mediation Service. Id., Pt. B, §
5(3), (6).
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which the judgment appealed from had been rendered. 20 Rule 73
provided a single method of appeal for all actions-filing a notice of
appeal with the clerk of the superior court within thirty days from
the entry of the judgment. The record was also to be filed with the
trial court clerk, who was responsible for transmitting it to the clerk
of the Law Court. Rule 74 adopted the federal provision making
clear that co-parties could appeal jointly or separately. Rules 75 and
76 provided in detail for the preparation, contents, and transmission
of the record, again drawing on the federal model, but with details
retained from Maine practice. Rule 76A, unique to the Maine Rules,
carried forward provisions of the prior Supreme Judicial Court
Rules, including the traditional simultaneous filing of briefs and al-
location of one hour to each side for oral argument. 230
In the years immediately after 1959, several changes were made,
including the addition of a provision for cross-appeals, and a num-
ber of minor changes in such matters as the number of copies and
paper size of the briefs and record.2 31 In addition, in 1965, the court
promulgated Rule 76B, providing a procedure for certification to the
Law Court of questions concerning Maine law arising in federal
courts. This rule was based on a Maine Law Review article by McK-
usick proposing such a measure and on an enabling statute prepared
by him. 232
In 1967, substantial amendments recommended by the newly re-
constituted Advisory Committee were adopted by the court. These
changes were based in part on the pending proposed draft of Uni-
form Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure for the United States
Courts of Appeals.2 33 The amendments provided for sequential filing
of briefs and incorporated revised and elaborate timetables and pro-
cedures for the preparation and filing of the record and briefs. Other
229. M.R. Civ. P. 73 reporter's notes (1959). As to the prior practice, see Merrill,
Some Suggestions on Taking a Case to the Law Court, 40 ME. ST BAR Ass'N RE.
175 (1951). Rule 72 had no equivalent in the Federal Rules. It preserved the prior
statutory practice of reporting by agreement doubtful questions or cases made on an
agreed statement of facts and added a provision for report of an interlocutory ruling
on motion of the aggrieved party. M..t Civ. P. 72 and reporter's notes (1959).
230. See M.R. Civ. P. 76A and reporter's notes (1959); Rules Applicable only to
Proceedings in Supreme Judicial Court, 147 Me. 488-91 (1952), as amended, 148 Me.
533 (1953), 152 Me. 57 (1956), 153 Me. 221-24 (1957), 153 Me. 382 (1958).
231. See M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) and advisory committee's note to 1966 amend., 2
FoiLD, McKuscK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 149, 153; M.R. Civ. P. 73(e) advisory
committee's note to 1966 amend., id. at 189; M.R. Civ. P. 75 (1) advisory committee's
note to 1966 amend., id. at 188.
232. M.R. Civ. P. 76B and explanation of amend. (1965), 2 FzMED. McKusicx &
WROTH, supra note 24, at 242-44. See id. at 245-52; McKusick, supra note 12; P.L
1965, ch. 158 and ch. 513, § 2, amending M. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57.
233. 34 F.R.D. 267-324 (1964). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
changed in some respects from the proposed rules, were promulgated December 4,
1967. Order of Dec. 4, 1967, effective July 1, 1968, 389 U.S. 1063-1120.
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changes made specific provision for motion practice in the Law
Court, imposition of the costs of producing the prevailing party's
brief on the losing party, and interest on judgments.2 3 4 A new Rule
76A was also adopted, providing for enlargement of time on stipula-
tion and the counter-measure of dismissal for want of prosecution,
and allowing the Law Court to modify or suspend all provisions of
the appeals rules, except the jurisdictional times of Rule 73(a), on
motion of a party or on its own motion.
211
The basic purpose of the 1967 amendments, according to the Ad-
visory Committee's notes, was to bring to Maine practice the bene-
fits of closure and sharpness of issues enjoyed in the majority of
states and the federal courts as a result of sequential filing of briefs.
While the revised filing times increased the total potential time that
could elapse in the appellate process from 155 to 190 days, this in-
crease was said to be illusory, because under the former practice ex-
tensions of time were always necessary and, in any event, both par-
ties were given ample opportunities to speed up the process.23 In
addition to this explanation of purpose, the Advisory Committee's
Notes to these amendments are a remarkable guide to appellate
practice, pointing out how the amendments have sought to embody
"the better practice of counsel appearing regularly before the Law
Court" and offering detailed suggestions as to that practice.
237
Although a few additional amendments were made to the appeals
rules in the ensuing years, 38 the next major changes were adopted
in 1978. These amendments, designed to reduce both the expense of
an appeal and the time consumed in the appellate process, were
taken from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as finally
adopted in 1967. In the words of the Advisory Committee: "This
adaptation brings to Maine a tested procedure that is working well
in the United States Courts of Appeals." The changes were also in-
tended to increase uniformity for the benefit of those practicing in
both state and federal court or seeking interpretive authority for
234. The amendments also consolidated all provisions pertaining to the record in
a new Rule 74. See M.R. Civ. P. 73-76A and advisory committee's notes to 1967
amends., 2 FIELD, McKusIcK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 149-241; Wroth, supra note
47, at 79-86.
235. See M.R. Civ. P. 76A and advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., 2 FIELD,
McKusicK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 236-38.
236. M.R. Civ. P. 74 advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., 2 FIELD, McK-
USICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 189-93.
237. M.R. Civ. P. 75A advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., id. at 215. See
M.R. Civ. P. 74 advisory committee's note to 1967 amend., id. at 192-93.
238. See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) and advisory committee's note to 1969 amend.,
id. at 155; M.R. Civ. P. 74 and advisory committee's note to 1969 amend., id. at 193-
94. Rule 75D was added by the court, effective October 1, 1969, to make provision for
the composition and sessions of the Law Court, pursuant to the legislative invitation
to do so contained in P.L. 1969, ch. 354. Id. at 229-30. For amendments adopted
between 1970 and 1978, see id. at 429-538 passim (Supp. 1981).
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The effect of the amendments, which centered on a total revision
of Rule 74 and the addition of new Rules 74A, 74B, and 74C, was to
provide that the "record on appeal" consisted of the entire original
record of the trial including the transcript. For convenience, the par-
ties were to prepare and submit with the briefs a "record appendix"
containing the parts of the record most likely to be in question. In
sharp contrast to prior practice, however, the parties and the court
were not limited to matters appearing in that document, because the
entire original record, transmitted to the Law Court by the superior
court clerk, was before the court and open for consideration on the
appeal.240
With a further series of amendments adopted by the court in 1980
without direct input from the Advisory Committee, it became ap-
parent that the focus of reform of appellate practice had shifted to
the court's growing need to manage its own docket. The main thrust
of the 1980 amendments was to place in the Law Court and its clerk
greater control over the mechanics and timing of the appellate pro-
cess. Thus the appeal was now to be docketed in the Law Court
immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, rather than upon
receipt of the record as formerly. Superior court jurisdiction thereaf-
ter was limited to post-judgment motions terminating the running of
the time for appeal, other necessary motions, and proceedings on
certain interlocutory appeals. The trial transcript was to be trans-
mitted directly to the clerk of the Law Court by the reporter, rather
than through the superior court clerk. The parties were no longer
permitted to stipulate for enlargement of time. The provisions gov-
erning dismissal for want of prosecution were simplified, and the
court was authorized to impose treble costs for frivolous appeals.
Specific provision was made for a motion for rehearing to be brought
in a fourteen-day period established between the date of the court's
opinion and the issuance of its mandate. Finally, the time for oral
argument was further reduced from thirty to twenty minutes per
side.241
239. See M.R. Civ. P. 74 advisory committee's note to 1978 amend., 2 FiL.
McKusICK & WROTH, supra note 24, at 458-60 (Supp. 1981). The provisions primarily
adapted were FED. R. ApP. P. 12, 30. Id.
240. See M.R. Civ. P. 74, 74A, 74B, 74C advisory committee's notes to 1978
amends., id. at 457-61, 484-86, 493, 499-501. McKusick's ABA Special Committee on
Federal Procedure had, in 1968, presented a report supportive of FED R. AP. P. 30
and the record appendix. See supra note 4.
241. See M.R. Civ. 73(f) & (g); 74(b)(1) & (3); 74A(a), (b). & (d); 75C(b); 76(0;
76A(a) & (b) advisory committee's notes to 1980 amends., 2 FtmD. McKusica &
WROTH, supra note 24, at 431, 462, 487, 522-23, 527, and 535-36. The provision of
Rule 73(f) allowing the superior court to retain jurisdiction in certain interlocutory
appeals even after docketing in the Law Court was extended to include discovery
orders, temporary and preliminary injunctions, and partial summary judgments by an
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Subsequent amendments have further tightened and sharpened
the Law Court's powers. In 1982, the procedure of Rule 76A(b) for
rehearing was retitled "reconsideration" and more stringent provi-
sions on the motion, adapted from the Rules of the United States
Supreme Court, were added to the rule.242 A 1983 amendment of
Rule 75B clarified and added more detail to the procedure on mo-
tions in the Law Court, making different provision for "procedural"
and "substantive" motions.24 3 Amendments in 1986 and 1987 to
Rule 75C provided stricter sanctions for nonappearance at oral argu-
ment and allowed the Law Court to dispense with oral argument in
cases where the appeal appeared frivolous or the issues clear.24' Rule
73(b) was also amended in 1987 to provide expressly that the notice
of appeal was to be considered a "pleading" so that the sanctions of
Rule 11 could be applied to an attorney signing the notice on a friv-
olous appeal.2"4
It is evident that the appeals rules, too, have run their course
from provisions designed and adjusted to make life easier for the
parties, to a set of rules tightly structured and controlled by the Law
Court to assure the maximum efficiency of operation as the court
deals with its ever-increasing docket. In the appellate sphere, in con-
trast to pretrial litigation practice, because the court administers
and observes its own proceedings and because no particular constit-
uencies have vested interests in the procedural prerogatives of ap-
pellants and appellees, the effort has been largely a successful one.
Counsel and court alike understand the ground rules, and the
docket of the Law Court is disposed of with relative swiftness and
predictability.
CONCLUSION
Vincent McKusick brought to the practice of his profession in
Maine a highly trained and finely tuned legal intellect and a sound
instinct for the essential role of procedure in the legal system. He
was the right person in the right place at the right time when the
opportunity arose to work with Richard Field on the initial adoption
of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and the writing of Maine
Civil Practice. This involvement readied him not only to take on the
amendment effective February 15, 1991. M.R. Civ. P. 73(f) and advisory committee's
note to 1991 amend., 538 A.2d No. 4 at CXXV, CXXXI (advance sheet).
242. M.R. Civ. P. 76A(b) and advisory committee's note to 1982 amend., Me.
Rptr., 441-448 A.2d XXV-XXVII.
243. M.R. Civ. P. 75B and advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me. Rptr.,
449-458 A.2d LVI-LVII, LXIV-LXV.
244. M.R. Civ. P. 75C(e) & (f), and advisory committee's notes to 1986 and 1987
amends., Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XLIV, XLIX; 510-521 A.2d XXXV, XXXVI. The
latter provision was adapted from FED. R. App. P. 34(a). Id.
245. M.R. Civ. P. 73(b) and advisory committee's note to 1987 amend., Me. Rptr.,
510-521 A.2d LXXXVI, XCIV.
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leadership of Maine's civil rulemaking process but to attain national
exposure and prominence as well. Thus, his work on the Maine
Rules was guided and informed by his experience at the highest
levels of the American Law Institute, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Asso-
ciation. As Chief Justice since 1977, McKusick has contunued his
national involvement and has continued to give rulemaking the
highest priority, building a solid and smoothly functioning system of
committees and supporting consultants that assures systematic re-
view of the rules in operation and continuing communication be-
tween the court and the bar and public. The result is that Maine is a
national leader in the quality and scope of its rules of court.
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure as they have evolved within
this system differ in many significant ways from those promulgated
in 1959. There have been major changes in the provisions governing
such areas as parties and the jury. The use of the civil action for a
variety of administrative purposes and judicial review of administra-
tive action have greatly expanded. There have been numerous
changes in the format and basic structure of the Rules. Changes in
areas such as process and pretrial and appellate procedure have
been responsive to growing concerns both for fairness in the system
and for a less costly and more efficient means of resolving disputes.
All of these changes mirror the impact of the social and economic
changes of the last three decades upon the court system as a whole.
As this Article demonstrates, the process of change is a continuing
one. Even now the rulemaking committees are considering proposals
designed to meet new challenges. If Maine succeeds in meeting these
challenges, it will be because the state is able to build on the legacy
of Vincent McKusick.
I close on a personal note-perhaps to be read only by the one
reader who I can be sure has come this far. I have had the privilege
and good fortune to be associated with Vincent McKusick in the
enterprise which I have sought to document since shortly after I
came to Maine in 1964. He introduced me to the business of making
rules and quickly showed me its range from late night drudgery to
moments of high intellectual excitement and creative satisfaction.
He taught me much about the art of articulating complex ideas of
policy and practice in intelligible language, as well as refinements
ranging from the difference between the Supreme Judicial Court
and the Law Court to the proper use of "that" and "which." Most
important, he has shown me that intense and persistent application,
combined with common sense, unfailing good humor, courtesy, and
patience, will unravel and resolve virtually every problem. We will
miss those attributes at the head of Maine's Judicial Department,
but we can be assured that we will enjoy the benefit of them in other
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ways. For Vincent McKusick has left us not so much a legacy as a
benefaction that he will join us in continuing to tend and nurture
for many years to come.
